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LIMITATION OF SHIPOWNERS' LIABILITY-THE BRUSSELS
CONVENTION OF 1957
IN most seafaring nations, limitation of liability immunizes shipowners from
ruinous damages for loss or injury occasioned by wrongful or negligent con-
duct of employees.' Actually an indirect form of subsidy,2 limitation reflects
an internationally prevalent policy of governmental support of local shipping.3
In operation under the American Limitation Act,4 for example, a shipowner
is permitted to establish a fund from which all claimants--owners of cargo,
passengers,5 seamen, 6 and even shoreside individuals 7--are to be compen-
sated.8 The claim may be either contractual or delictual, 9 although contract
1. Limitation history and background have been extensively discussed. See 3 BENE-
DICT, ADMIRALTY §§ 541-44, 475-78 (6th ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as BENEDICT] ; GIL-
MORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 663-67 (1957) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK];
ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 875-77 (1939) [hereinafter cited as ROBINSON]; MARITIME LAW
Ass'N, Doc. No. 196, LIMITATION OF SHIPOWNER'S LIABILITY (1935); Putnam, The
Limited Liability of Ship-Owners for Master's Faults, 17 Am. L. REV. 1 (1883); Sprague,
Limitation of Shipozners' Liability, 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rav. 568 (1935); Springer, Amend-
ments to the Federal Law Limiting the Liability of Shipowners, 11. ST. JOHNS L. REV.
14 (1936) ; Note, 35 CoLuM. L. REv. 246 (1935).
2. See Hearings on H.R. 4550 Before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (1935) ; Springer, supra note 1, at 19. But see Hear-
ings on H.R. 4550, supra at 148-49. When used in this sense, "subsidy" refers to a gov-
ernmental policy which relieves shipowners of an expense they would otherwise be forced
to bear. The term is more commonly associated with governmental payments directly to
shipowners. For a description of this kind of subsidy, see GILMORE & BLACK 760-69;
Adler, British and American Shipping Policies, A Problem and a Proposal, 59 POL. Scr.
Q. 193, 196-99 (1944).
3. See Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207, 214 (1927);
Petition of the United States, 155 F. Supp. 714, 718 (D. Del. 1957) ; Petition of Canadian
Pac. Ry., 278 Fed. 180, 186-87 (W.D. Wash. 1921); VAN SANTVOORD, LIMITATION OF
THE LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNERS UNDER THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (rev. ed.
1887) ; authorities cited note 1 supra.
4. REv. STAT. §§ 4281-89 (1875), as amended, 46 U.SC. §§ 181-89 (1952).
5. E.g., Butler v. Boston & Savannah S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527 (1889) (passengers);
3 BENEDICT 358; GILMORE & BLACK 677-78 & n.45 (collecting cases on cargo and pas-
sengers).
6. See In the Matter of East River Towing Co., 266 U.S. 355 (1924) (Jones Act
claim) ; Petition of Wood, 230 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956) (same) ; 3 BENEDICT 358, 363-64.
7. See Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911); The Wichita Falls, 15 F. Supp.
612, 616 (S.D. Tex. 1936) (limitation denied but act held applicable when guards on ship
fired on striking longshoremen) ; GILMORE & BLACK 679 n.45 (collecting cases).
8. REV. STAT. § 4283 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1952); ADMIRALTY R.
51.
9. See 3 BENEDICT 344; GILMORE & BLACK 706. The statement that limitation applies
in contract tends to be misleading since limitation is essentially designed to relieve owners
from the respondeat superior tort doctrine. See authorities cited note 1 supra. More ac-
curately, limitation can be described as applying to claims based on an employee's wrong-
ful actions, whether or not the action technically sounds in tort. Cf. GILMORE & BLACK
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claims may be fully recoverable if the owner's obligation is "personal."' 0 Once
the fund is distributed, all claimants subject to the court's jurisdiction are
denied recourse to the shipowner's other assets." Institutionalization of cargo
insurance minimizes the effect of limited recoveries in that sphere,' 2 but the
denial of full damages to prsonal injury and death claimants, rarely insured,
has caused mounting disapproval.13
,Criticism has also been directed toward the duplication of limitation litiga-
tion and the heterogeneity of limitation laws.' 4 Since a maritime suit may
be commenced by libel in rem against the offending vessel or in personam
against her owner,'c jurisdiction will obtain wherever ship or owner may
be served, as well as wherever the owner possesses other property' 6 or, in
the case of a corporation, does business.17 And since accidents at sea typi-
cally couple claimants of diverse nations with a highly mobile vessel and/or
an owner having interests throughout the world, a multiplicity of suits is prac-
599 (cargo claims can be based on either contract or tort). Courts have removed "pure"
contract claims from the scope of limitation primarily through application of the personal
contract doctrine, see note 10 infra, and also by holding them outside the act, see The
Leonard Richards, 41 Fed. 818 (D.N.J. 1890).
10. See 3 BENEDICT 371-78; GILMORE & BLACK 706-11; Castles, The Personal Con-
tract Doctrine: Aa Anomaly in American Maritime Law, 62 YALE L.J. 1031 (1953). The
doctrine seems to rest on the notion that owners have the privilege of contracting away
their right to limitation. See The Philip J. Kenny, 57 F.2d 337 (D.N.J. 1931).
11. See GILMORE & BLACK 671-73. Limitation procedures are governed by ADMIRALTY
R. 51-55, which were promulgated by the Supreme Court to fill the procedural void
created by the act.
12. See INTERNATIONAL MARITIME COiMa., MADRID CONFERENCE-PRELIMINARY RE-
PORTS AND MINUTES AND DRAFT CONVENTIONS 75 (1955) [hereinafter cited as MADRID
CONFERENCE] ; GILMORE & BLACK 727.
13. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1954) (dissenting opinion);
GILMORE & BLACK 667 (limitation shows signs of "economic obsolescence"); Springer,
stpra note 1, at 38-39; Note, 68 U.S.L. REV. 617, 641 (1934) (limitation "vicious in its
tendencies and unconscionable in its results"). All attempts to institute a system of com-
pulsory passenger insurance have failed. See BisscHop, LIMITATION OF SHIPOWNER'S
LIABILITY AND COMPULSORY INSURANCE OF PASSENGERS (1.927); Note, 35 COLUM. L.
REv. 246, 264 (1935).
14. See GILMORE & BLACK 740; DOVER, MARINE INSURANCE 523 (5th ed. 1957);
Kuhn, International Aspects of the Titanic Case, 9 Am. J. INT'L L. 336, 347 (1915);
McMillan, Scottish Maritime Law and International Trade, 45 JURID. RFv. 63 (1933).
15. Gn Z0oR & BLACK 31-33; MARSDEN, COLLISIONS AT SEA 228 (10th ed. 1953).
16. "[I]n the case of a collision on the high seas, an alien plaintiff has the privilege
of suing an alien defendant wherever he can serve him, or attach his property. ... "
Kloeckner Reederei und Kohlenhandel, G.M.B.H. v. A/S Hakedal, 210 F.2d 754, 756
(2d Cir. 1954).
17. As in other areas of the law, an admiralty court must decide how much activity
within the jurisdiction is required to make an owner amenable to valid -service. See, e.g.,
Federazione Italiana Dei Consorzi Agrari v. Mandask Compania De Vaporas, S.A., 158
F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Applewhaite v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 150 F. Supp.
825 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (regular and continuous cargo solicitation held sufficient activity) ;
Ashcraft-Wilkinson Co. v. Compania De Navegacion Geamar, S.R.L., 117 F. Supp. 162
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) (steamship agents and brokers not doing sufficient business on behalf
of shipping company to be considered managing agent).
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tically guaranteed.18 Moreover, each of these suits may be governed by a dif-
ferent substantive law,'8 since the principal limitation forums have adopted the
conflicts doctrine of lex fori in limitation proceedings, 20 rather than the more
18. One recent case involved a collision with 155 claims, including 71 British, 18 Ger-
man, 8 Dutch, 1 each from Austria, Ireland, Italy, and Norway. See Brief for Petitioners,
p. 37, British Transp. Comm'n v. United States, 354 U.S. 129 (1952). In the Norwalk
Victory case, Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386 (1949),
suits were filed in New York and London, and there was a possibility of a third in Ant-
werp. Knauth, Renvoi and Other Conflicts Problems in Transportation Law, 49 COLUM.
L. REv. 1, 3 (1949).
The doctrine of forum non conveniens does not alleviate the shipowner's difficulties to
any great extent.
[T]he case of destroying or injuring a ship, ...when acted on the high seas,
between persons of different nationalities, come within the domain of the general
law of nations, or communis juris, and are prima fade proper subjects of inquiry
in any Court of Admiralty which first obtains jurisdiction of the rescued or of-
fending ship at the solicitation in justice of the meritorious, or injured, parties.
The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 362-63 (1885). See generally Bickel, The Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35
CORNELL L.Q. 12 (1949). See also Comment, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 377 (1958). Despite the
general rule, jurisdiction may be refused if "special circumstances" are involved. See
Comment, 31 TEXAS L. REv. 889, 891 (1953). The existence of a limitation proceeding
in another forum, however, will not so qualify. See 68 HARv. L. REV. 706 (1955). And no
possibility of transferring or dismissing an in rem action exists. See Motor Distribs., Ltd.
v. Olaf Pedersen's Rederi A/S, 239 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1957) ; 32 HARv. L. REv. 574
(191-9).
19. "We see no absurdity in supposit~g that if the owner of the Titanic were sued in
different countries, each having a different rule affecting the remedy there, the local rule
should be applied in each case." Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Mellor, 233 U.S. 718, 734
(1914) (the Titanic case).
20. See id. (limitation held procedural so American law applies) ; Royal Mail Steam
Packet Co. v. Companhia de Navegaco Lloyd Brasileiro, 31 F.2d 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1928) ;
3 BENEDICT 635-37; GRIFFIN, AwERICAN LAW OF COLLISION 53 (Knauth ed. 1949) ; HuRD,
MARINE INSURANcE 42 (2d ed. 1952) (British Act applies to foregoing shipowners); 2
RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 352 (1947) (Britain and the United States ignore "the
place of the tort and of the nationality of the ships" in limitation proceedings) ; RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICTS § 411 (1934). Continental nations apply the limitation law which gov-
erns the tort claim. 2 RABEL, op. cit. supra at 353.
United States courts are the principal limitation forums. See CoMmiTTrr TO CONSIDER
PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNERS, MARITIE LAW
AsS'N, Doc. No. 418, REPORT 4262 (1958) [hereinafter cited as MLA REPORT].
The viability of the Titanic case may have been weakened by Black Diamond S.S.
Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386 (1949). This case, which has been charac-
terized as "extraordinarily obscure," GILMORE & BLACK 737, indicated in dictum that if
the foreign limitation law were "substantive" it might be applied to actions brought in
this country. A subsequent Second Circuit opinion, however, seems to have rejected any
implication in this dictum that would depart from the Titanic rule. Kloeckner Reederei
und Kohlenhandel, G.M.B.H. v. A/S Hakedal, 210 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1954); see Note,
67 YALE L.J. 1445, 1448 n.9 (1958).
The Titanic rule has often been criticized. See VAN SANTVOORD, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 66; Comment, 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 388 (1950). See also The Vestris, 53 F.2d 847, 852
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) (bill to make limit on foreign ships in American courts no higher that
the foreign statute failed in Congress).
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usual maritime rules of lex loci delicti or law of the flag.21 The injured party's
ability to forum shop, therefore, will often have substantial effect on the a-
mount of his recovery. 22
For example, two claimants suffering identical injuries may obtain disparate
damages if only one has the financial resources to prosecute his claim in the
United States, where limits are relatively high.23 Shipowners must not only
bear the cost of numerous actions, but may be effectively deprived of limita-
tion benefits through imposition of the maximum statutory liability in each
forum-nation.2 4
To ameliorate these problems, and simultaneously remove inequities in in-
ternal rules, the 1957 Brussels Convention on Limitation of Liability 25 was
promulgated.2 6 Submitted to the United States for approval, the convention
has been referred to various government agencies and the maritime industry
for detailed study.27 Tentative reactions by the American shipowning com-
munity indicate that the convention will encounter substantial opposition when
congressional approval is ultimately sought.28 To further a complete evalua-
21. See RoBiNsON § 1.12; Kuhn, supra note 14, at 340; Comment, 31 TEXAS L. REV.
889, 894-95 (1954) ; Note, 67 YALE LJ. 1445, 1447 (1958).
22. For other factors which encourage forum shopping in maritime cases, see ROBIN-
SON 903-04; McFEE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 282-83 (1950).
23. Recently, one claimant prosecuted his claim 3,000 miles away from home in order
to avail himself of the American limitation statute. Brief for Black Diamond S.S. Corp.,
Petitioners, p. 35, Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386
(1949).
24. See Knauth, supra note 18, at 3; 68 HARV. L. REv. 706, 708 (1955).
25. The complete text of the convention, as given in Department of State, Press Re-
lease No. 577, Oct. 15, 1957, can be found in APPENDIX A. [Hereinafter the convention
will be cited by article only.]
26. The Brussels Convention was the culmination of a process that began with a draft
prepared by the Comite Maritime International, a private body composed of delegates
from various maritime law associations, at Madrid in 1955. See MADRID CONFERENCE. The
Diplomatic Conference held at Brussels, on the other hand, was composed of official rep-
resentatives from the participating nations. For a list of these nations and their subse-
quent activities concerning the convention, see APPENDIX B. The United States' represen-
tatives were Clarence Morse, Federal Maritime Administrator (chairman of the delega-
tion), John W. Mann, Shipping Division, Department of State (vice-chairman), Oscar
N. Houston, a leading member of the admiralty bar, and E. Robert Seaver, General
Counsel, Maritime Administration. See U.S. Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference on
Maritime Law, Official Report, Nov. 18, 1957, p. 2. The only previous attempt to reach
international accord in the limitation area was the Brussels Convention of 1922. This
agreement was ratified by Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. 3 BENEDICT § 543, at 639. In this Comment all references
to the "Brussels Convention" will be to the 1957 proposal.
27. MLA REPORT 4253; N.Y. Times, May 3, 1959, § 5, p. 17, col. 5.
28. See MLA REPORT 4243:
Your Committee, after extensive study of the proposed Brussels Convention, con-
cludes that as a whole it is not acceptable to or in the best interests of American
shipowners, passengers, maritime labor or shippers. Accordingly, we are unable to
recommend that the United States adhere to the proposed Convention, although
16791959]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tion, this Comment will examine the convention in its historical setting and
as it compares with existing American law. Interpretations or amendments
necessary either to clarify ambiguities or to effectuate limitation policies will
be suggested. And an attempt will be made to outline a course of future con-
duct toward the convention.2 9
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The earliest form of limitation was the civil-law practice, still adhered to in
many European nations, of restricting shipowner liability to the value of the
vessel at the conclusion of her ill-fated voyage-the "abandonment" doc-
trine.30 By thus foreclosing recovery against all assets save the ship, this sys-
tem often left claimants with a worthless hulk while marine insurance enabled
owners to undertake new maritime ventures.31 Soon the British shipping in-
dustry was placed at a competitive disadvantage, for in England the doctrine
of respondeat superior was as fully applicable afloat as it was ashore.32 Eng-
lish shipowners finally succeeded, during the early eighteenth century, in ob-
taining statutory limitation protection.33 But unlike continental practice, the
British system contemplated recompense notwithstanding the ship's total de-
struction, since liability was limited to vessel value measured immediately be-
fore the accident. 34 Subsequently, the preaccident-value formula was replaced
by a sum computed by multiplying ship tonnage times a given number of
pounds sterling.3 5 Prior to the Brussels Convention, the fund was pegged at
fifteen pounds per ton, with seven pounds reserved exclusively for personal
injury and death claims. The balance was shared with cargo.36
certain provisions are or may be beneficial to various branches of the shipping in-
dustry.
Officially, the Report represents the efforts of the maritime bar rather than shipowners
themselves. But the owners will undoubtedly heed the advice of counsel on a subject as
complex as limitation.
29. Relatively few articles have been written about the convention, and most of these
have been in British publications, prompted by British ratification. See Aaronson, The
Brissels Conference on Maritine Law, 1957, 107 L.J. 758 (1957) ; Giles, Merchant Ship-
ping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1958, 21 MODERN L. REV. 642 (1958);
Hardy-Ivany, The Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1958,
108 L.J. 547 (1958) ; Conference on Maritine Law, The Shipping World, Oct. 23, 1957,
p. 347.
30. See Sprague, supra note 1, at 569; Note, 35 CoLum. L. Rxv. 246, 247 & n.1
(1935).
31. Id. at 259 n.79, 261 n.8 7 .
32. The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 126 (1894) (discussing English law);
Sprague, supra note 1, at 571.
33. Responsibility of Shipowners Act, 7 Geo. 2, c. 15 (1734) ; Sprague, supra note 1,
at 571 (statute passed as a result of "severe liability compared with the limited liability
enjoyed by ship owners on the Continent").
34. Id. at 589; Note, 35 CoLumn. L. REv. 246, 262 & n.92 (1935) ; Kuhn, supra note
14, at 346.
35. The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, § 503; 3 BENEDICt 638-39.
36. See ibid.; MLA REPORT 4245.
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American shipowners were not alerted to their vulnerability until the Su-
preme Court held in 1843 that the owner of a destroyed vessel was fully liable
for cargo damage.3 7 Appealing to Congress, they rapidly secured passage of
the Limitation Act of 1851.38 The statute limited liability to the value of the
owner's "interest" in the vessel, but did not specify whether value was to be
measured before or after the accident.2 9 Congressional debates alluded solely
to the British system which at that time utilized the preaccident-value for-
mula.40 But despite this explicit reference, the Supreme 'Court, refusing to
construe the act as embodying English practice, held that the continental
"abandonment" theory had been imported by the act,41 and that insurance pro-
ceeds were not part of the owner's "interest. '42 The inequities inherent in
this system went largely unnoticed for the next sixty years, mainly because of
37. New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants' Bank (The Lexington), 47 U.S. (6
How.) 343 (1848).
38. REv. STAT. §§ 4281-89 (1875) ; see GILMORE & BLACK 664 (Congress was "easily
persuaded").
39. REv. STAT. § 4283 (1875).
40. See 3 BENEDICT 332-33; Sprague, supra note 1, at 577-78 (bill introduced to Con-
gress, purported to be English law) ; GILMORE & BLACK 666 ("The purpose of the 1851
Act had been to put American shipowning interests on a competitive equality with Brit-
ish interests, so far as limitation of liability was concerned. English limitation law, it
might have been supposed, was the obvious analogy to which our courts would look in
developing our limitation law.").
41. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 119-21 (1871). The Court's
decision reflected the fact that the act closely resembled many features in the abandon-
ment system then prevailing on the Continent. Cf. British Transp. Comm'n v. United
States, 354 U.S. 129 (1957) (act patterned after British statute, but foundations sprang
from general maritime law). See also Sprague, supra note 1, at 589-90; Note, 68 U.S.L.
REv. 561, 572 (1934).
Whatever its rationale, the decision represented a significant step in what one com-
mentator has characterized as the "Americanization" of admiralty law. Comment, 61 YALE
L.J. 204, 206 (1952).
42. The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 494 (1886) (hull insurance). In Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1.954), a seaman sued his employer's liability insur-
ance company under the Louisiana direct action statute. Confronted with the first test of
the Norwich doctrine as applied to liability insurance, and the additional complexity added
by the direct action statute, the Court split three ways. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for one
four-justice group, thought Nomich controlling, but voted with Mr. Justice Clark in
order to break a deadlock. Mr. Justice Clark, fearing that satisfaction from the insurer
might leave the insured shipowner without indemnification in. a subsequent suit, concluded
that the direct action could not be brought until after limitation proceedings were con-
cluded. Then, claimants could sue the insurer for the difference between the total amount
of the policy and the amount that the owner was required to pay in the limitation pro-
ceeding. Mr. Justice Black, for the dissenters, would have allowed the suit. He rested his
argument to a large degree on the distinction between hull and liability insurance. Id.
at 621.
The result in Cushing has been praised, Note, 33 N.C.L. Rav. 464, 476 (1955) ("rea-
soned judicial compromise"), and criticized, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 68 HARV.
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the smallness of the American merchant marine.43 The 1920's, however, saw
an increase in merchant traffic, 44 with a concomitant increase in the number of
maritime disasters. Spurred by the 1934 sinking of the Morro Castle, 45 Con-
gress supplemented the postvoyage-vessel-value formula with a guaranteed
fund of sixty dollars per ship ton for deaths and personal injuries incurred
on ocean-going-as opposed to inland or coastal-craft.46 Hence, after rate-
ably distributing a vessel-value fund among all interests, personal claimant
recoveries are increased, when necessary, to the sixty dollars per ton mini-
mum.
47
Nevertheless, the act has been called insufficient to protect injured claim-
ants. 48  Indeed, commentators have challenged the logical nexus between
modem limitation and its original policy basis. 49 Restriction of respondeat
superior was first justified by the combination of voyage length and lack of
communications, which prevented owner control over crews?3 With the de-
vel6pment of modern ships and effective means of communication, 51 however,
L. REv. 96, 159-60 (1954) (the decision will discourage owners from taking out insurance
and increase rates for those who do).
On the legislative level, Senator Morse introduced a bill which would require owners
to pay the proceeds of hull and liability insurance into the limitation fund. 103 CoNG.
REc. 6257-58 (1957).
43. See GnioRE & BLACK 570; Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 1024, 1027 n.24 (1958).
44. See EcoNomIc ALMANAC 120 (1958).
45. See Hearings on H.R. 4550, supra note 2, passim. 135 people died in the Morro
Castle disaster with "countless" other injuries. While the vessel was insured for $4,000,000,
only $20,000 was available for claimants under the value formula. Id. at 7. See also
Springer, supra note 2, at 14; Note, 68 U.S.L. REv. 617, 640-41 (1934) ("glaring injus-
tice"). Actually, the owners of the Morro Castle voluntarily paid claimants a much
greater amount than the Limitation Act required. GrZmoRE & BLACK 717 n.135. A much
more striking illustration of the then applicable limitation system was The Princess
Sophia, 61 F.2d 339, 355 (9th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 604 (1933), where 350
people died and the available fund was only $600.
46. 49 Stat. 960 (1935), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1952); see Comment, 10
TuLANE L. REv. 119 (1935); Note, 28 TEXAS L. REv. 433, 434 (1950).
47. For a description of the act's operation, see GILmoRE & BLACK 718; In re Panama
Transp. Co., 98 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (example of prorating claims).
48. See MLA REPORT 4243 ("Changed conditions may make it reasonable to . .. in-
crease . . . the sum provided for injury and death claimants.") ; Statement of Senator
Morse, 103 CONG. REc. 6257 (1957) (fund "inadequate in the cases of most casualties or
injuries").
49. "Attention should be given to the entire revision of the laws relating to limitation
of liability.... [They] grew up in an age profoundly different from our own, and there
is no reason why today under modern conditions the owner should be other than liable
to the full extent." Hoover Report from the Department of Commerce, reprinted in Hear-
ings on H.R. 4550, supra note 2, at 42; see GILmOnE & BLACK 667; Springer, supra note
1, at 38.
50. "[T]he owner of the vessel has no manner of control over it. . . . He is free
from personal liability on elementary principles." HOLMES, THE CommoN LAw 27 (1881);
see Note, 35 CoLuNr. L. REv. 246, 247 & n.1 (1935).
51. See MADRID CONFERENCE 417 (ships no longer make two-year voyages). But see
Hearings on H.R. 4550, supra note 2, at 115 (witness maintains that owners still have
no effective control over crew's negligence).
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proponents of limitation turned for vindication to the exigencies of shipping.
Since a single voyage often represented the entire capital of a particular ven-
ture, the further risk created by imposition of personal liability might well
have discouraged investment.5 2 Present foes of limitation have noted, though,
that the growth of corporations as the predominant form of business organi-
zation has in fact enabled shipowners to limit liability to corporate assets even
without the act.53 And with the formation of protection and indemnity clubs
to insure owners against the risk of liability, denial of limitation would have
few effects other than increased premiums r
But abolition of limitation has been strongly resisted. Although conceding
that a revised approach is necessary, some have argued that no nation can
afford unilaterally to raise the liability ceiling or abrogate limitation entirely
because of the competitive disadvantage that would accrue to the local mari-
time industry. Each nation would prefer to have any changes anchored in the
52. The great object of the statute was to encourage shipbuilding and to induce the
investment of money in this branch of industry. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Southern
Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207, 214 (1927); see CHORLEY & GILEs, SHIPPING LAw 41 (3d ed.
1957) (disaster to one ship could ruin owner financially). But see VAN SANVOORD,
LIMITATION OF THE LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNERS UNDER THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
66 (rev. ed. 1887) (importance of limitation as an inducement to investment greatly
exaggerated).
53. See GILMORE & BLACK 667 (limitation developed "before the corporation had be-
come the standard form of business organization"); cf. Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v.
Robert Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386, 399 (1949) (dissenting opinion) (limitation serves
same purpose for maritime venturers as corporate fiction does for the landsmen's enter-
prise). But see CHORLEY & GILES, op. cit. supra note 52, at 42 (increase in size of ships
matched increase in use of corporate form so disaster can cause as much damage to cor-
poration as it did to individual owner).
Some observers have indicated that owners might take further refuge in the corporate
device by incorporating each ship separately if limitation were abolished. MADRID CON-
FERENCE 197; Hearings on H.R. 4550, supra note 2, at 165. But this scheme might prove
unsuccessful if courts were willing to pierce the corporate veil. Cf. Luckenbach S.S. Co.
v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676 (4th Cir. 1920).
54. See MADRID CONFERENcE 68 (insurance eliminates risks) ; Gartland, Limitation of
Liability and the Seaplane, 16 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 209, 220 (1942) (necessity for limita-
tion "no longer apparent"). But see CHORLEY & GILES, op. cit. supra note 52, at 42:
[T]he modern practice of insuring all ships [should not] be an argument against
the limitation of the shipowner's liability. For one thing, some ships are still un-
insured against some perils they encounter, sometimes through circumstances for
which no blame attaches to the owner. More than that, though underwriters reap
the direct benefit of such limitation, they are by enjoying it enabled to charge lower
premiums, so that in effect the old purpose still holds good. The shipowner's risk
is reduced when he lets his vessels sail on a sea adventure.
Protection and indemnity insurance is a form of liability insurance which developed
to insure risks which were not covered in the usual collision policy, such as personal in-
jury and property damage claims. For the history and background of protection and in-
demnity insurance, see BERNARD, MARINE PROTEcTION AND INDEMNITY INSURANCE (1957);
DoVER, MARINE INSURANCE 486-50 (5th ed. 1957); HuRD, MARINE INSURANCE 97, 142-
49 (2d ed. 1952); WINTER, MARINE INSURANCE 274-75, 309 (3d ed. 1952).
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matrix of an international agreement.55 The pragmatic impossibility of obtain-
ing universal repeal has eliminated that suggestion from serious consideration.
Accordingly, to forestall sporadic unilateral action, the world shipping com-
munity sponsored the Brussels Convention.
THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION OF 1957
The Brussels meeting attempted to unify the entire body of substantive and
procedural rules which attend limitation proceeding, and not merely to raise
and equate limits. Therefore, the convention deals with the problems of when
limitation applies,56 who is entitled to its benefits,57 and what claims are to
be barred from full recovery,58 besides establishing a limitation formula and
a system for distributing the fund. 9 Also, the assembly promulgated a series
of rules designed to coordinate related proceedings in different nations.!"
When Limitation Applies
Limitation will not apply in a ratifying nation unless the vessel involved is
"seagoing. ' 61 By explicitly permitting each signatory to specify the classes of
shipping to be included within this term, 62 the convention affords an excellent
opportunity to effect needed alterations in the American act. Although it
originally protected only those shipowners engaged in international trade,0 3
the limitation statute was subsequently amended to include all "vessels,"
whether or not competing with foreign carriers.64 Judicial interpretations in-
55. See MAsDaiD CONFERENCE 70 (Italian delegate afraid to increase limits since nations
which "remain outside" may have an advantage). The possibility that national legislation
would have increased the limits for British shipowners unilaterally may have spurred
British efforts to promulgate an international convention which would raise limits through-
out the world. See id. at 54; 75-76. But cf. Note, 68 U.S.L. R~v. 617, 637 (1934) (Brit-
ish shipping still grew in the late nineteenth century even though American limitation law
more favorable to shipowners).
56. Arts. 1 (1)-(4).
57. Art. 6.
58. Arts. 1.(1)-(4).
59. Arts. 2, 3, 4.
60. Arts. 2(4), 3(3)-(4), 5, 7.
61. Art. 1(1) refers only to owners of "seagoing ships," and art. 6 gives charterers
and crew members no greater protection than owners.
62. Art. 7.
63. See GILmORE & BLAcK 674-75; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 413-
14 (1954) (act places American shipowners in a "favorable position" for world trade) ;
The Princess Sophia, 61 F.2d 339, 346 (9th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 604 (1933)
(reluctant to apply act to foreign shipowners since the act was designed to aid American
interests) ; Mundell, Admiralty Law and Your Pleasure Craft, 34 U. DET. L.J. 141, 153
(1956). See also Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 204, 205 (1952) (importance of international
trade to the United States).
64. The original Act of 1851 excluded inland vessels. REy. STAT. § 4289 (1875) ; see
3 BENaicr 403. It was expanded in 1886 to include all "seagoing vessels" and all ves-
sels used on lakes, rivers, or inland navigation, including canal boats, barges, and lighters.
24 Stat. 80 (1886), 46 U.S.C. § 188 (1952).
1684 [Vol. 68:1676
BRUSSELS CONVENTION
cluded such craft as scows, 5 motorboats, 66 and pleasure yachts 07 within
"vessel." Despite criticism of this extension, 6 Congress bestowed added bene-
fits upon the owners of these small craft by exempting them from the pro-
visions of the act which set aside a special fund, based on tonnage, for per-
sonal injury claimants. Thus, liability is still limited by postaccident vessel
value.69
Perhaps limitation should be denied to all minor inland and coastal craft.
Any risk created would be readily insurable. Nor will increased premiums
create any competitive disadvantage, since competition comes only from other
domestic rivals who would also be denied limitation. Indeed, the owners of
pleasure yachts and most rowboats are not engaged in economic competition
at all.
Alternatively, Congress could abrogate the postaccident-value formula for
these minor craft by including them within the convention's "seagoing" pro-
vision. Then, minimum recoveries would be guaranteed, as the tonnage stand-
ard adopted by the Brussels meeting creates a fund even if the vessel is entire-
ly destroyed.70 To ensure that such augmented claimant protection will not
65. See The Sunbeam, 195 Fed. 468 (2d Cir. 1912) ; In re Eastern Dredging Co.,
138 Fed. 942 (D. Mass. 1905). See also Goggin v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.
Cal. 1948) (landing craft).
66. See Rautbord v. Ehmann, 190 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1951). See also Grays Landing
Ferry Co. v. Stone, 46 F.2d 394, 395 (3d Cir. 1931) (dictum says small rowboat not
covered while case holds large one is).
67. See Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943); Petition of H & H Wheel Service,
Inc., 219 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1955).
In one recent case, the claimant founded his argument solely on policy considerations,
maintaining that "the inclusion of ... railroad car lighterage . . . would not contribute
in any way to putting American shipping upon an equality with that of other maritime
nations." This argument was rejected on the basis that application of the statute was
"too clear to require extended discussion." The Rincon Hills v. The Long Branch, 258
F.2d 757, 770 (2d Cir. 1958).
68. See GILMORE & BLAcK 700 ("charter of irresponsibility" for yacht owners) ; id.
at 674-75; VAN SANTV ooRD, LIMITATION OF THE LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNERS UNDER THE
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 136 (rev. ed. 1887). But see Petition of Colonial Trust
Co., 124 F. Supp. 73, 75 (D. Conn. 1954) ("There is reason behind a policy of encour-
aging the building of pleasure craft as well as larger commercial vessels. It gives ad-
ditional work to shipyards whose men are thus enabled to preserve their skills .... ").
69. Limitation Act § 183(f), 49 Stat. 1480 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 183(f) (1952):
[T]he term "seagoing vessel" [the category of vessels subject to the personal in-
jury provisions] shall not include pleasure yachts, tugs, towboats, towing vessels,
tank vessels, fishing vessels or their tenders, self-propelled lighters, nondescript self-
propelled vessels, canal boats, scows, car floats, barges, lighters, or nondescript
non-self-propelled vessels, even though the same may be seagoing vessels within
the meaning of such term as used in the [general coverage section].
This extension has also been criticized. See GILMORE & BLACK 719-20.
70. The minimum limitation fund created by the convention in personal cases is ap-
proximately $52,000 since all vessels are treated as if they weigh at least 300 tons for
limitation purposes. Art. 3(5). And while personal claimants have an exclusive right
only to $140 a ton, they share another $67 with cargo. See art. 3,
1959] 1685
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
be judicially restricted, Congress should enumerate the types of vessels sub-
sumed by the term "seagoing," and should explicitly deny limitation to all
others.
71
The convention, continuing limitation tradition, applies only when claims
arise from the wrongful conduct of employees. Protection is not granted,
therefore, for accidents which result from the owner's "actual fault or priv-
ity."72 This phrase, transplanted from the English statute,73 could conceivably
alter American law, since the corresponding language in the Limitation Act-
"privity and knowledge" 74-- is thought to have been interpreted more favor-
ably to claimants than its British counterpart.7 Drafters' debates, however,
fail to indicate any intention to confine signatories to English rules of owner
culpability.7 6 Should the United States adopt the convention, then, the Ameri-
can courts would presumably be free to continue to follow American prece-
dents.
Retention of American precedents would prevent the exchange of "actual
fault or privity" for "privity and knowledge" from reversing the trend toward
increased claimant protection which has developed steadily under the Limita-
tion Act. Early cases sympathized with the budding maritime industry to the
point of excluding claimant protection.77 Courts then construed "privity and
knowledge" as something more than negligence, 78 even if the act would, in
71. The term "seagoing" is highly ambiguous, since it may either describe a type of
vessel or its usual location. See GiLmoRE & BLACK 720.
72. Art. 1(1).
73. Merchant Shipping Act, 1874, 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, § 503.
The phrase is also embodied in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49 Stat. 1210 (1936),
46 U.S.C. § 1304(2) (a) (1952).
74. Rav. STAT. § 4283 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1952).
75. "[T]here has been little to complain of in the application of . . . the right to
limit by Continental Courts; but the readiness of the United States Courts to deprive a
shipowner of the right of limitation . .. has greatly detracted from the protection afforded
by the American Limitation Acts." Statement of British delegate, MADRID CONFERENCE
56.
The leading British cases dealing with "actual fault or privity," however, do not seem
to depart from American decisional law to any great degree. See Koninklijke Rotter-
damsche Lloyd v. Western S.S. Co., [1957] A.C. 386 (1956); Beauchamp v. Turrell,
[1952] 2 Q.B. 207; Standard Oil Co. v. Clan Line Steamers Ltd., [1924] A.C. 100 (1923);
The Bristol City, 37 T.L.R. 901 (C.A. 1921). But the area in which U.S. courts have
gone furthest in denying limitation-imputing responsibility to corporate employers-has
rarely been litigated in England. See note 84 infra.
76. See Unofficial (Free Translation) Debates of the Diplomatic Conference on the
Laws of the Sea, Brussels [hereinafter cited as Brussels Debates], Morning Sess., Oct.
1, 1957, pp. 19-24.
77. See Note, 68 U.S.L. Rav. 561, 567-68 (1934); 3 BENEDicT 333-34 & nn.42-49
(collecting cases).
78. "[-M]ere negligence, pure and simple, in and of itself does not necessarily estab-
lish the existence on the part of the owner of a vessel of privity and knowledge within
the meaning of the statute." La Bourgogne, 210 U.S. 95, 122 (1908) ; see Capitol Transp.
Co. v. Cambria Steel Co., 249 U.S. 334 (1919).
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other contexts, have been considered a nondelegable duty.7 But as subsidies,
insurance, and other devices decreased the need for limitation protection, judi-
cial attitudes shifted. 0 For example, recent decisions have denied limitation if
the owner delegates responsibility for the vessel to a third party.81 Also, if
the accident is attributable to a defect in the ship existent at time of embar-
kation, the owner's failure to provide a "seaworthy" vessel may constitute
privity and knowledge (and presumably "fault"), even though maintenance
and inspection duties were assigned to an admittedly competent employee.8 2
Most important, though, is the treatment of imputed responsibility problems
created by the corporate form of ship ownership. At one time, courts decid-
ing whether the conduct of a particular employee was to be ascribed to the
corporate entity held the company liable only for the acts of managing agents
or supervisors high in the corporate echelons.8 3 Currently, the corporation is
likely to be held responsible for the acts of all persons exercising any type of
supervisory authority.8 4
79. See The Yungay, 58 F.2d 352, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (nondelegable duties "rarely
found in limitation of liability issues") ; The South Coast, 71 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1934),
ccrt. denied, 293 U.S. 627 (1935) ; GiLwOR & BLACK 703; cf. Earle & Stoddart v. Eller-
man's Wilson Line, Ltd., 287 U.S. 420, 427 (1932) ("The courts have been careful not
to thwart the purpose of the fire statute by interpreting as 'neglect' of the owners the
breach of what in other connections is held to be a non-delegable duty.").
80. "There is at least some reason to believe that the judicial attitude in the second
half of the twentieth century will be on the whole hostile to the limitation idea, that the
early cases will be whittled down if they are not flatly overruled." Gizrom & BLACK
667. This prediction has been conceded to be of "startling accuracy" by one observer.
Statement of E. Robert Seaver, General Counsel, Maritime Administration, MLA REPORT
4269. The case which inspired this endorsement was States S.S. Co. v. United States
(The Pennsylvania), 259 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1958), discussed at note 84 infra.
Privity-and-knowledge case law background has been extensively reviewed in 3 BENE-
DICT §§ 489-90; GILmoR & BLACK 695-705; ROBINSON § 124.
81. See The Severance, 152 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1945) (father gave entire manage-
ment of ship to son) ; The Silver Palm, 94 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 304
U.S. 576 (1938) ; In re Great Lakes Transit Corp., 81 F.2d 441 (6th Cir. 1936). But see
The Trillora II, 76 F. Supp. 50 (E.D.S.C. 1947).
82. Austerberry v. United States, 169 F.2d 583, 594 (6th Cir. 1948) ; The Cleveco,
154 F.2d 605, 614 (6th Cir. 1946); New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Corp. v. Continental
Ins. Co., 117 F.2d 404, 410 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Petition of Boat Demand, 160 F. Supp. 833,
836 (D. Mass. 1958). But cf. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Gulf Ref. Co., 230 F.2d 346,
355 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 832 (1956) (unseaworthiness not neglect under fire
statute).
The trend toward increased claimant protection has not been particularly apparent in
the Second Circuit. See The Rincon Hills v. The Long Branch, 258 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.
1958); Blackler v. F. Jacobus Transp. Co., 243 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1957) (limitation
granted though shipowner on board at time of accident).
83. See In re Pennsylvania R.R., 48 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1931) ; Sprague, Limitation
of Shipowners' Liability, 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 568, 593-94 (1935) (collecting cases);
Springer, Antendnwnts to the Federal Law Limiting the Liability of Shipouners, 11 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 14, 27 (1936) (collecting cases).
84. See States S.S. Co. v. United States (The Pennsylvania), 259 F.2d 458 (9th Cir.
1957), as modified, id. at 463, as amended on denial of rehearing, id. at 470 (1958) ; The
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American precedents will probably not be followed everywhere, however,
and convention inability to adopt definite standards by which owner conduct
can be measured will reduce the chances of international uniformity.85 And,
any uniformity that might obtain through universal convention adoption and
harmonious interpretation is negated by a proviso allowing the lex fori to
determine which party--owner or claimant-is to bear the burden of proof in
demonstrating "actual fault or privity."86 This position represents a compro-
mise between conflicting views of French and American delegates. The latter
maintained that, since shipowners usually have sole access to relevant facts,
placing the burden on claimants would severely handicap them.8 7 Despite the
Marguerite, 140 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1944) ; Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Brasileiro, 159
F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1947).
The Pennylvadia, supra, has attracted wide attention in maritime circles. See note 80
supra; Letter From Clarence Morse, Maritime Administrator, April 7, 1959, copy on
file in Yale Law Library. In that case, the vessel had developed a crack on the voy-
age preceding the one involved in the case. It was repaired and inspected by the
owner's employees, the Coast Guard, and the American Bureau of Shipping. Having
passed all tests, the vessel was subsequently used on a voyage where it encountered cold
waters and turbulent weather. The ship developed a crack in her hull, at a different place
from the original injury, and went down with all hands. After two rehearings, the court
denied limitation. The decision seems to stand for several far-reaching propositions. First,
although the court explicitly denies any intention to do so, the decision comes close to
establishing a rule that owners liable under COGSA for failure to exercise "due dili-
gence" will also be denied the protection of the limitation statute. This position seems to
be supported by GILmoe & BLAcKc 696-97. Also, the decision may indicate that if unsea-
worthiness is found, the corporation will not be able to escape the privity and knowledge
prohibition by maintaining that the ship's condition was caused by nonsupervisory per-
sonnel. The duty to ensure the ship's seaworthiness is seemingly placed on the entire cor-
porate entity.
Another convention provision which might cause some difficulties is art. 1(1) (b),
which provides that owner may limit against claims brought by people not on board the
ship if caused by people not on board the ship "for whose act, neglect, or default, the
owner is responsible" only if "the act, neglect, or default is one which occurs in the navi-
gation or the management of the ship or in the loading, carriage or discharge of its cargo
or in the embarkation, carriage or disembarkation of its passengers." Superficially, this
section seems to allow limitation whether or not the shoreside employee was in the kind
of position of responsibility that would require his negligence to be imputed to the owner.
But art. 1 (1) (b) is qualified by the first paragraph of art. 1 (1), which allows limitation
"in ... any of the following occurrences, unless ... the claim resulted from the actual
fault or privity of the owner." Thus, the actual fault or privity requirement is embodied
in 1(1.) (b) ; it incorporates the entire body of law relating to imputed responsibility.
Actually, this section seems to be a restriction of the owner's right to limit since it in-
sures that limitation will be invoked only when the claim is closely related to the opera-
tion of the ship.
85. The French delegate to the convention frankly abandoned any hope to achieve
uniformity on this issue: "[The actual fault and privity clause] will permit the tribunals
of each country to follow its [sic] own conception of the law." Brussels Debates, Morn-
ing Sess., Oct. 1, 1957, at 21.
86. Art. 1(6).
87. ;See Brussels Debates, Afternoon Sess., Sept. 30, 1957, at 11; Brussels Debates,
Morning Sess., Oct. 1, 1957, at 21 (statement by Mr. Morse). Under the Limitation Act
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cogency of this argument, French representatives, unable to conceive that
owners could affirmatively demonstrate lack of fault, insisted that claimants
bear the burden of proof.88 By adopting a lex fori rule to reconcile this clash
of opinions, the convention encouraged continued forum shopping. Limitation
decisions will turn, in many cases, upon which party bears the burden of
proof.8 9 Thus, claimants financially able to select any forum they wish will
litigate in countries adhering to the American system. When the convention
next reconvenes to consider amendments, therefore, as is provided for by
article 15,90 the le.r fori provision should be eliminated, and the burden of
proof placed on the shipowner seeking limitation.
Who Can Limit
By providing that "charterers" shall be entitled to limit, article 6 of the
convention may conflict with present American law. The Limitation Act's
protection is extended only to owners or those who stand temporarily in the
posture of owners. Thus, bareboat-demise--charterers, who man, victual,
and navigate the vessel, are considered owners pro hac vice, and may limit,9 '
while time and voyage charterers, who lease crew as well as ship from the
owner, may not. 2 Rejection of an American amendment designed to restrict
article 6 to bareboat arrangements apparently indicated that the conference
desired to include all charterers. 93 Debates, though, reveal that many delegates
the burden is upon the owner. See Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 407 (1943); The
Silver Palm, 94 F.2d 776, 777 (9th Cir. 1937).
88. Brussels Debates, Afternoon Sess., Sept. 30, 1957, at 12 ("negative proof is no
proof at all") ; Brussels Debates, Morning Sess., Oct. 1, 1957, at 20.
89. See, e.g., In re Jacobson, 52 F.2d 179 (S.D. Tex. 1931) (owner fails to sustain
burden of proof).
90. Art. 15 provides that any contracting nation can, after the convention has been
in force in that nation for three years, request that the conference reconvene to consider
amendments. The convention will not have binding international effect until it has been
ratified by ten states, at least five of which have one million gross tons. Art. 10. Only
one nation that meets this qualification-Great Britain-has ratified to date. See APPEN-
DIX B.
91. Limitation Act § 186, REV. STAT. § 4286 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 186 (1952), provides
that "the charterer of any vessel, in case he shall man, victual, and navigate such vessel
at his own expense, or by his own procurement, shall be deemed the owner of such vessel
within the meaning of the provisions of this chapter relating to the limitation of the lia-
bility of the owners of vessels." It is possible to "man, victual, and navigate" the vessel
without being a charterer. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Vang, 73 F.2d 88, 90
(3d Cir. 1934), petition for cert. dismissed on petitioner's wtilon, 294 U.S. 735 (1935).
92. See The Severance, 152 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 853
(1946) ; The James Horan, 10 F. Supp. 28 (D.'N.J.), aff'd, 78 F.2d 870 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 621 (1935) ; GILmoRE & BLACK 673.
Although the statement of the applicable rule of law is relatively simple, distinguishing
among the various types of charterers is often difficult. See, e.g., Petition of United
States, 155 F. Supp. 714, 717 (D. Del. 1957); Banks v. Chas. Kurz Co., 69 F. Supp. 61,
66 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
93. The amendment would have inserted "demise" before the word "charterer." Brus-
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did not appreciate the distinctions among the various charterers which the
United States sought to draw ;94 thus, Congress may be free to restrict this
provision to bareboat lessees.
If so, Congress could adopt the convention with a restrictive interpretation
of article 6, or it could accept the convention as e-xtending limitation pro-
tection to time and voyage charterers. The latter alternative would not serious-
ly disadvantage personal injury claimants, who would normally sue owners,
to whom the negligence of employees is usually imputed,9 5 rather than time
or voyage charterers. And allowing all charterers to limit would produce more
rational results than the Limitation Act, which may offer scant protection to
both those shipowners who also charter and those who charter to others.
Often, during periods of short tonnage, large shipping lines supplement their
own fleets with time or voyage chartered vessels.90 If one of the chartered
vessels is involved in an accident, the shipping line may be forced to pay
damages to cargo claimants without the benefit of limitation. Yet, assuming
an identical mishap with an owned or demised vessel, protection would be
afforded. The act's benefits, therefore, are dependent on the fortuitous cir-
cumstance of the particular vessel's status.97 If the owner is chartering to
sels Debates, Afternoon Sess., Oct. 8, 1957, at 16. It was defeated by a vote of 5-15-10
(for, against, abstain). Id. at 23.
94. At one point, Mr. Houston clearly indicated that his motion was intended to ex-
clude time charterers from the convention's scope. Id. at 17. But M. Ripert, the French
delegate, did not seem to understand the distinctions which Houston sought to draw:
At the beginning of this Conference it was agreed that limitation of liability could
be invoked not only by the shipowner but also by the person who takes full charge
of a ship; by the charterer, who is, after all, the real operator. Now, the United
States delegation envisages simply the demise charterer, which is not at all the
same as the one who, chartering a vessel engages in the operation of his ship....
Id. at 23. (Emphasis added.)
More important, the convention never held a separate vote on the charterer issue.
The United States' motion was presented as an alternative to a British proposal which,
inter alia, extended limitation to the servants of the charterer, manager, and operator of
the ship, and to agents of the owner. Most of the debate revolved around these latter
provisions as they were not included in the American alternative. Id. at 15-23. In fact,
the British delegate never even addressed himself to the charterer problem. See id. at 17,
20. And it is impossible to decide on what basis the final vote was cast, particularly since
one-third of the nations abstained. See note 93 supra.
95. See California v. The Jules Fribourg, 140 F. Supp. 333, 337 (N.D. Cal. 1956)
(negligence of master imputed to owner not charterer). But cf. Petition of Skibs A/S
Jolund, 250 F.2d 777, 787 (2d Cir. 1957).
96. See GiLmoRE & BLACK 171.
97. "If it be unequal, and in that sense inequitable, that the owner of the vessel
should be relieved by the statute from a large part of the damage resulting from the
negligence of his own employe, while the charterer who suffers from the same negli-
gence is not relieved, it can only be said that this relief is a statutory and arbitrary
one.. . ." Smith v. Booth, 110 Fed. 680, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1901).
Some of the hardship caused by the statute may be relieved by recasting the forms of
the charters. "Time" charterers, for example, may be able to arrange the transaction so
as to bring themselves under the limitation canopy. See American Subcomm., Report, in
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others, the presence of indemnification agreements may render the act's pro-
tection illusory. Under present law, claimants, such as cargo, who can choose
between suing a negligent owner in tort or a non-bareboat-charterer for breach
of contract, will choose the latter, because limitation would not apply. But as
the charter party usually provides for complete indemnification in this situa-
tion, the charterer will in turn collect from the owner.98 Thus, the chance
interposition of the charterer may require owners to satisfy fully otherwise
limitable claims. Inversely, cargo claimants, who are able to sue a charterer
ex contractr for failure to deliver, can receive full compensation, while other
claimants, injured in the same accident, will have recourse only against the
owner, and will collect limited damages.
Besides precluding such haphazard recoveries, article 6 ensures that owner
liability will not exceed the limitation ceiling. Hence, though separate suits are
instituted against charterer and owner, a recovery of full limited damages from
either will bar collection of additional compensation from the other.9 Other-
vise, claimants with actions against both might well sue the shipowner for the
limitation fund, and then seek additional damages from the charterer who
would later be compensated by the owner under an indemnification agreement.
Many nations ratifying the convention probably will apply article 6 to all
charterers. 100 Both rational application of limitation principles and interna-
tional uniformity would be served by similar American extension.
But the convention provisions which extend limitation coverage to crew-
members are of more dubious wisdom. 101 Under American law, limitation has
MADRID CONFERENCE 199 ("The ship venture is often in major substance that of the time
charterer only. Since he may protect himself by assuming the 'victual and man' status of
the demise charterer, no valid objection is seen to direct protection.").
98. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. McAllister Lighterage Line, 240 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.
1957) ; GL mORE & BLACK 796 (owner responsibility clause reprinted as part of sample
charter). See also The Barnstable, 181 US. 464, 471 (1901) (no general right to in-
demnification without contract).
The owner cannot limit against the charterer's claim since it is based on his personal
contract. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
99. The pertinent portion of art. 6 states that "the total limits of liability of the
owner and all such other persons in respect of personal claims and property claims aris-
ing on a distinct occasion shall not exceed the amounts determined in accordance with
Article 3 of this Convention." This section would not seem to apply to indemnification
agreements between charterer and owner as it comprehends only those claims which can
be limited. Moreover, with charterers able to limit, the indemnification payment will
rarely exceed the owner's limited liability.
100. At the Madrid Conference the British delegate indicated that Britain would
probably extend limitation to time charterers. MADRID CONFERENCE 59. And the codifica-
tion of the convention into British law refers to "any charterers." Merchant Shipping
(Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 62, § 3(1) ; see Giles,
Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1958, 21 MODERN L. REV.
642, 643 (1958).
101. Art. 6(2):
[T]he provisions of this Convention shall apply to charterer, manager and opera-
tor of the ship, and to the master, members of the crew and other servants of the
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traditionally been considered only a device for protecting shipowners, and was
therefore never expanded to include employees. 10 2 The convention clause was
presumably inserted to forestall possible union demands for employee indem-
nity agreements which could result in shipowner payments greater than the
limitation fund.10 3 And the convention also blocked two possible paths to this
result within a context of employee limitation. First, since the crewmember's
personal negligence would necessarily constitute "actual fault," employee
limitation is applicable in spite of fault.'0 4 Second, employers may credit em-
ployee reimbursements against the fund.10 5 For example, if the statutory ceil-
ing is ten, recovery of eight from crewmen would restrict claimant recourse
against the shipowner to two. Arguably, this "single limit" provision alone
would furnish sufficient owner protection against over-ceiling payments to
obviate the necessity of limiting employee liability. Total indemnification pay-
ments would exceed the normal limit only in the unlikely instance when a sea-
man would be able to respond in damages for more than the fund amount.10
owner, charterer, manager, or operator acting in the course of their employment
in the same way as they apply to an owner himself ....
Art. 6(3) :
When actions are brought against the master or against members of the crew such
persons may limit their liability even if the occurrence which gives rise to the
claims resulted from the actual fault or privity of one or more of such persons.
If, however, the master or member of the crew is at the same time the owner, co-
owner, charterer, manager or operator of the ship, the provisions of this paragraph
shall only apply where the act, neglect or default in question is ... committed...
in his capacity as master or as member of the crew of the ship.
102. See notes 1 and 8 supra.
The convention also changes American law by allowing the owner to limit notwith-
standing his personal negligence if he is acting in his capacity as a crewmenmber. Art.
6(3). For examples of American law see Petition of Follett, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. 258
(S.D. Tex. 1958) (limitation denied when owner operated his own motorboat) ; King v.
Liotti, 76 N.Y.S.2d 98 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (same).
Apparently, the convention was designed to allow owners of small ships to man their
own vessels without risking unlimited liability. See Aaronson, The Brussels Conference
on Maritime Law, 1957, 107 L.J. 758 (1957). This provision should be given a restric-
tive interpretation in order to preserve claimant protection. Thus, whenever the owner-
crewmember is required to make a decision or assume a responsibility that in other
situations would be handled by a crewmember only if the owner were not available, he
should be treated as if he stood in the posture of an available owner. Otherwise, he would
be able to increase his protection by assuming personal command.
Also, art. 7, which allows shipowners of a ratifying nation to limit in all other
adherent countries, would alter the provision of the Death on the High Seas Act which
prevents foreign shipowners from limiting against death claims in United States courts.
41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 764 (1952).
103. 'See MADRID CONFERENCE 470.
104. Art. 6(3) ; see MADRID CONFERENCE 470.
105. See art. 6(2).
106. The only danger in this system is that claimants might be able to sue owners
directly on the indemnification agreement in the same manner that suits are allowed di-
rectly against insurance companies in some states. Cf. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347
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And denying protection to employees would nullify any criticism of extending
limitation to a class able to enjoy its benefits despite personal negilgence.
Nonetheless, extension of limitation to crewmembers would not greatly
prejudice claimants, who would usually look to the owner for satisfaction
rather than the often judgment-proof seaman. Indeed, if the crewmember's
negligence caused a serious collision, any possible contribution he could make
would represent at best only an insignificant portion of the total damages.
Realistically, then, this section should not substantially impede convention
ratification in the United States.
Claims Subject to Limitation
The convention allows limitation against all maritime and nonmaritime
claims for "personal injury ... damage to . . . property or infringement of
any rights." 0 7 Additionally, article 1(3) extends limitation to cases in which
"proof of negligence" need not be introduced-cases of absolute liability.'08
This provision, when read in concert with article 1 (1) (c), could conceivably
affect American law. For, by separately enumerating the two most prominent
maritime strict-liability situations known in America-injuries to harbors and
injuries caused by unremoved wrecks ' 0 9-article 1(1)(c) leaves uncertain
what other claims would be covered by American adoption of article 1(3)'s
"proof of negligence" clause." 0
U.S. 409 (1954). See also W. R. Grace & Co. v. Charleston Lighterage & Transfer Co.,
193 F.2d 539, 544 (4th Cir. 1952) (owner liable directly to third party suing charterer).
107. Art. 1(1).
10. Art. 1(3) ; see Brussels Debates, Morning Sess., Oct. 8, 1957, at 2, 11-12.
Another section of art. 1 prohibits limitation against salvage and general average
claims. Art. 1(4) (a). The general average reference comports with United States law.
See The Win. J. Quillan, 168 Fed. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); The Rapid Transit, 52 Fed.
320 (D. Wash. 1892). The opposite is probably true of salvage claims. GILMoRE & BLACK
677 n.45; see id. at 726 n.159; 3 BENEDICT 356.
The convention's alteration seems needed. As salvage awards are granted in order to
insure that aid to distressed vessels is freely rendered, any limitation would negate the
incentive furnished by the award. Moreover, the salvor's fee is only tangentially related
to acts of the owner's servants, and is not the kind of expense usually viewed in the per-
spective of respondeat superior.
109. Under American law, the owner can limit against the strict liability imposed by
state and city laws regulating canals and harbors. See City of Newark v. Mills, 35 F.2d
110 (3d Cir. 1929); The Central States, 9 F. Supp. 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1935); 3 BENEDICT
365 & n.74 (collecting cases) ; GILmORE & BLACK 679. But he cannot limit against the
absolute liability imposed by the Federal Wreck Statute, 30 Stat. 1152 (1899), 33 U.S.C.
§ 409 (1952). See The Snug Harbor, 53 F.2d 407, 411-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1931) (duty to
mark wreck personal and nondelegable).
110. This difficulty seems to have arisen because the British delegate insisted that the
convention specifically provide limitation against liability based on wreck or harbor dam-
age. See Brussels Debates, Morning Sess., Oct. 8, 1957, at 11. Why he refused to accept
the Norwegian delegate's contention that these liabilities were included in art. 1(3) is
unclear. See id. at 11-12.
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Perhaps article 1(3) could nullify the "personal contract" doctrine now
obtaining in English and American law. Judicially constructed, this principle
denies the owner limitation whenever losses occasioned by a maritime accident
result from a breach of his personal covenant."1 The doctrine is usually in-
voked in charterers' actions against owners for breach of warranty of sea-
worthiness."12 And, since no actual "proof of negligence" need be introduced
in warranty actions," 3 courts might deem them comprehended by article 1(3),
allow limitation, and thereby effectively repeal the personal contract doctrine.
This result is not dictated by the convention; debates refer to article 1 (3) only
in the context of absolute tort liability. 114 If abrogation of the well-established
personal contract principle were intended, it is inconceivable that it would
neither be referred to nor discussed. True, this approach, interacting with
article 1(1) (c), would deprive article 1(3) "5 of much content in the United
States. Still, such a result is preferable to sudden (and perhaps unintentional)
revocation of the doctrine. Rejection--or codification-should follow only after
specific consideration of the many ramifications that could attend either course.
Limitation Amount
Throughout history, various mechanisms have been employed to establish
the limits of owner liability. Value of the vessel at the beginning or end of
the voyage, before or after the accident, or a stated currency amount per ship-
ton have all been applied by different nations to different claims at different
times." 6 Attempting to find a single method uniformly applicable, yet univer-
111. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
.112. See The Soerstad, 257 Fed. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (doctrine limited solely to
warranty of seaworthiness action) (L. Hand, J.) ; Cullen Fuel Co. v. W. E. Hedger, Inc.,
290 U.S. 82 (1933) ; Pendleton v. Benner Line, 246 U.S. 353 (1918) ; W. R. Grace & Co.
v. Charleston Lighterage & Transfer Co., 193 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1952) ; W. E. Hedger
Transp. Corp. v. Gallotta, 145 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1944) ; The Fred Smartley, Jr., 108 F.2d
603 (4th Cir. 1940) ; GILmORE & BLAC'K 707.
113. In every contract for the carriage of goods by sea, unless otherwise expressly
stipulated, there is a warranty on the part of the ship-owner that the ship is sea-
worthy at the time of beginning her voyage, and not merely that he does not know
her to be unseaworthy, or that he has used his best efforts to make her seaworthy.
The warranty is absolute ... and does not depend on his knowledge or ignorance,
his care or negligence.
The Caledonia, 43 Fed. 681, 685 (C.C.D. Mass. 1890), aff'd, 157 U.S. 124, 130 (1895),
cited with approval in The Edwin I. Morrison, 153 U.S. 199, 210 (1894).
114. See note 108 supra.
115. Art. 1(3) could apply only to a small class of cases in which liability might con-
ceivably be deemed absolute. See The Frederick Luckenbach, 15 F.2d 241 (S.D.N.Y.
1926) (deviation) ; 3 BENEDicT 369 (statutory faults other than Wreck Statute).
116. The following limitation systems are currently in effect:
British-provides a specific sum per ton for both personal and property damage (used
by Great Britain and Canada).
Latin-owner discharges liability by abandoning ship to claimants. Thus, the limitation
amount is the value of the ship and freight pending at the termination of the voyage
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sally acceptable, the convention settled on the English tonnage formula for all
claims.1n 7 The British fund ceiling was boosted, however, by utilizing a com-
plex sliding-scale mechanism which now provides, in terms of American cur-
rency, 140 dollars per ton for personal injury and death recoveries exclusively,
and sixty-seven dollars more to be divided rateably with cargo.11 Also, a floor
was placed under the fund by a provision presuming all ships to weigh at least
300 tons." 9 Thus, the United States system, which retains as its base the post-
voyage-value formula for all claims, but guarantees personal claimants a basic
fund of sixty dollars per ship-ton, was completely rejected. 2 0 This underlies
most industry opposition to the convention in this country. Shipowners main-
tain that abandonment of the ship to claimants, now reflected in the value
formula, remains the theoretical basis of modern limitation statutes, with ton-
nage provisions for personal claimants merely a necessary exception. 121 Ad-
ditionally, antagonism can be traced to a fear that intensive review of limita-
tion policy, certain to attend any alterations in the recovery formula, might
eventuate in complete denial of protection. 22
Shipowner hostility notwithstanding, the tonnage mechanism should be ap-
proved, for it represents a surer path to proper recovery than the postvoyage-
value formula. True, under American law, a limit measured exclusively by
value applies to personal injury and death claims only on certain inland and
preceding the filing of the claims (used by Egypt, Greece, Japan, Roumania, and all the
Central and South American countries (except Brazil)).
German-claims can be filed only against the ship in rem and not against the owner.
Brussels Convention of 1922-owner liable for the value of his ship or a given value
.per ton, whichever is lower (used by Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden).
American-property claims limited to value of ship and freight pending at termination
of voyage giving rise to the claim; personal claims guaranteed a fixed amount per ton
fund. See 3 BENEDIcr 643-47; MARMTIuE LAw Ass'N, Doc. No. 196, LImiTATioN OF SHIP-
OWNEs' LABIL TY 2014-27 (1935).
11.7. Art. 3.
118. The "sliding scale" is found in the provisions stating the limitation figure in
terms of the gold content of a Poincaire franc. See note 137 infra and accompanying
text. For the translation of the art. 3(1) figures into American currency (3,100 gold
francs currently equal $207), see U.S. Delegation to Diplomatic Conference on Maritime
Law, Official Report, Nov. 18, 1957, p. 5.
119. Art. 3(5).
120. See also MADRID CoNFmRENcE 473-74.
121. See MLA R:PoRT 4256-58.
122. "The only objection I have heard, aside from minor objections to incidental pro-
visions that could easily be corrected in the implementing legislation, stems from a fear
that Congress might repeal the Limitation Act if the subject is brought up in any way."
Letter From Clarence G. Morse, Maritime Administrator, April 7, 1959, p. 3, copy on
file in Yale Law Library; see Statement of the Vice-President of the International
Maritime Committee, MADRID CONFERENcE 80 (the MLA stated that it would be "danger-
ous" to submit a limitation draft to Congress because someone with a "demagogic mind"
might suggest abolition of limitation) ; id. at 473 (American delegate expressing fear that
if question of limitation opened, "no one can tell where that may lead").
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coastal craft.123 But under a plan based solely on value, even in this limited
area, a collision which totally or substantially destroys the vessel, and hence
the source of the personal claimant's limitation fund, is the one most likely
to result in serious injuries.
In the field of cargo damage, on the other hand, the shift to tonnage would
affect marine carriers of all types. Because of extensive insurance coverage,
not prevalent in the personal injury sphere, the only real issue in this context
is whether the shipper's or owner's insurer must bear the loss. But the prob-
lem takes on added importance with the realization that the value formula has
subverted the substantive admiralty rules on distributing risk of cargo dam-
age, and, concomitantly, misallocated the premium increases attending loss re-
imbursement. The governing statute-CO GSA-renders shipowners liable, in
the absence of "due diligence," for unseaworthiness and mishandling of. cargo,
but assigns to shippers the hazards of negligent navigation or management of
the ship.124 Accidents caused by unseaworthiness often result in sunken or
badly damaged vessels, however, and the postvoyage-value formula, therefore,
frequently exonerates owners entirely. Thus, COGSA's risk distribution
scheme is thwarted, since the risk avoided by the owner through limitation is
shunted to the shipper (the unsatisfied cargo claimant) .125 Though the mone-
tary limits of tonnage also blunt the full impact of COGSA, this system will
at least prevent the bulk of insurance risks from being thrust upon cargo. In
fact, the tonnage formula can redound to the shipowner's ultimate advantage;
courts may refuse to grant limitation if this would result in complete denial
of recovery to cargo. A system of guaranteed minimum damages might well
preserve owner protection.
1 26
123. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
124. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act §§ 4(1)-(2), 49 Stat. 1210 (1936), 46 U.S.C.
§§ 1303-04 (1952).
125. Admittedly, COGSA specifically provides that it does not repeal the Limitation
Act. 49 Stat. 1212 (1.936), 46 U.S.C. § 1308 (1952). See also 29 CALIF. L. REV. 56-57
(1940). Nothing in COGSA, however, should prevent the adoption of a limitation system
that better effectuates COGSA policies. Indeed, one leading treatise seems to indicate
that limitation should be denied under the present Limitation Act if liability is established
under COGSA. GILmORE & BLACK 696-97. And there is some indication that this ap-
proach is finding acceptance in the courts. See States S.S. Co. v. United States (The
Pennsylvania), 259 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1957), discussed at note 84 slepro.
Use of the tonnage system as a measure of liability to cargo has also been urged on
the grounds that it gives the owner an incentive to exercise proper care. See MADRID
CONFERENCE 82-83 (Swedish delegate). Otherwise the shipowner may find it more profit-
able in some instances to abandon his ship and cargo completely than to incur salvage
expenses which merely preserve the ship's value for cargo claimants.
126. It seems quite possible that the Court of Appeals [in The Pennsylvania, dis-
cussed at note 84 supra] might have been motivated, at least in part, by a feeling
that the result of our Limitation Act is unduly harsh. Under the formula of the
Brussels Convention, the court would not have been faced with denying any re-
covery to the claimants if it allowed the owner to limit ....
It seems clear that the court would have been more favorably disposed to limit-
ing liability if it could have done so and still allowed a modicum of recovery to
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The tonnage system, unlike value or value-plus-tonnage, promotes the cer-
tainty necessary for a uniform limitation law. Under value-centered mechan-
isms, variations in the methods used to appraise the vessel, coupled with diver-
gent application from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, result in substantially dis-
crepant limitation funds.127 Moreover, "value" partially depends on the state
of the charter market. Thus, the more active the shipping, the greater the
recovery. 1 28 With tonnage, however, courts are relieved of the lengthy and
difficult task of determining ship value.1 29 All parties can precalculate their
risks and adjust insurance coverage accordingly.
Convention foes have focused on the supposed arbitrariness of the tonnage
measure. They maintain that tonnage was originally designed to reflect ability
to pay by approximating actual value per ton, and that this goal is not realized
by the Brussels figures. 30 Admittedly, older vessels are rarely worth 207 dol-
the claimants .... [T]he present opinion is a manifestation of the judicial erosion
that can be expected unless a limitation formula is adopted that meets the sense of
justice ....
Statement by E. Robert Seaver, General Counsel, Maritime Administration, in MLA
REPORT 4270. The same thought has been expressed by Clarence G. Morse, Federal Mari-
time Administrator. See N.Y. Times, May 3, 1959, § 5, p. 17, col. 5.
127. [T]he value of ships fluctuates not only in the country of their origin but fluc-
tuates widely according to the place where they are valued. Until a few years ago,
a vessel was worth nearly double in France, . . . what she was worth in England
-two... contiguous countries....
Again, is the claimant for recovery to depend upon factors of that type, over
which he has no control?
Statement of British Delegate, Brussels Debates, Morning Sess., Oct. 1, 1957, at 5.
128. During the last six months, . . . the freight market has collapsed. . . . The
result of that has been that the value of the tonnage of second-hand vessels has
been halved or more than halved. . . . [I]s it just that the recovery of the claim-
ants against the shipowner should depend upon the fluctuations of the freight mar-
ket? Because that is what the value system does entail ....
Ibid.; see Giles, Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1958, 21
MODERN L. REV. 642, 643 (1958) (under value formula recovery depends upon "fortuitous
circumstances"). See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1959, p. 77, col. 5 (used ship prices fell
50% in 1958) ; N.Y. Times, April 27, 1959, p. 48, col. 7 (used ship values "tumble" to
new lows).
129. For cases illustrating the difficulty of determining value, see The Black Eagle,
87 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1937) ; In re Union Ferry Co., 37 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1930) ;
Lowery v. The Ellen S. Bouchard, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1958). Compare
The Steel Inventor, 36 F.2d 399, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (use market value, disregard book
value and reconstruction costs), with The Natrona, 25 F.2d 507, 508 (E.D. Pa. 1928)
(no market so use "value to owners" based on cost less depreciation, plus advantage of
having vessel ready for use).
130. See MLA REPORT 4245, maintaining that the English Act of 1862, which first
introduced the value formula, was designed to be a "rough average value of all ships"
which saved the difficulty of individual valuations. The Report goes on to state that
"with the passage of time all relationship to value has disappeared and the figures have
become arbitrary."
The convention's alleged "arbitrariness" has been condemned as discriminatory against
low-cost ships. See id. at 4257; MADRID CONFERENcE 197.
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lars a ton, while postwar ships generally are worth more.131 The ability-to-pay
argument, however, is theoretically unsound. First, limitation is utilized only
after serious accidents, when amounts realizable by converting the vessel would
be unrelated to its preaccident per-ton value. More important, even if the ton-
nage multiplier could be geared to actual value, this could debase the policy
of claimant protection. Limitation funds would then be lowest for the older
vessels and claimant recoveries would be least where possibilities of injury
may be greatest.132 Finally, the protection of maritime enterprises whose use
of low value ships may indicate their inability to pay large damage claims
could be accomplished by protection and indemnity insurance, without special
limitation benefits. 13 3
Marine liability insurance, in fact, has greatly diminished the significance
of any particular limitation formula. As increased limits can be covered at only
a slightly higher premium cost,' 3 4 with increases passed on to cargo or pas-
sengers through higher rates, shipowner expense can be discounted. Instead,
attention should be directed to securing a limitation formula both internation-
ally acceptable and productive of adequate claimant recoveries. Tonnage a-
chieves both goals. Arguably, a fund based on the number of passengers or
amount of cargo carried would result in a more rational recovery scheme.1 3
131. See Statement by E. Robert Seaver, MLA REPORT 4271.
132. A vessel's age is considered important when determining its P. & I. rates pre-
sumably because older vessels are more likely to have defects which give rise to claims.
See BERNARD, MARINE PROTECTION AND INDEMaNITY INSURANCE 53 (1957).
133. See note 134 infra.
134. See Statement of British Underwriter, MADRID CONFERENCE 445: "I would like
to give it as my personal opinion that the eventual effect upon insurance cost will be al-
most negligible. The number of cases involving limitation on the existing basis is com-
paratively small when one pays regard to the vast field of our insurance activities." The
underwriter may have underestimated the importance of limitation statutes in determin-
ing P. & I. rates. See BERNARD, op. Cit. supra note 132, at 50 (limitation one of two
principal factors considered in P. & I. rates); DovER, MARINE INSURANCE 513-14 (5th
ed. 1957) (importance of limitation in marine insurance); Libby, Some Aspects of Pro-
tection and Indennity Inssurance, 1.952 INs. L.J. 684, 689 (owner's ability to limit a "prime
factor"). But even under the existing law owners may lose their right to limit under
certain circumstances, see notes 10, 72 supra and accompanying text, and must thus in-
sure for amounts greater than the statutory limitation figure, see BERNARD, Op. cit. .supra
note 132, at 50.
Keying an insurance system to the tonnage formula should not prove difficult since
present P. & I. premiums are geared to ship tonnage. See WINTER, MARINE INSURANCE
309 (3d ed. 1952).
For a discussion of similar problems in respect to aircraft, see Parker, The Adequacy
of the Passenger Liability Limits of the Warsaw Convention of 1924, 14 J. AIR L. & Com.
37, 41 (1947).
135. Under a system based on passengers or cargo carried, the funds available would
automatically increase with the funds needed to afford adequate recoveries. For passen-
gers, the fund would be calculated by establishing a limitation amount per passenger such
as is done in the Warsaw Convention for airplanes. See Parker, supra note 134. Unlike
the Warsaw plan, however, the aggregate of passenger limits could constitute a single
fund so that individual recoveries could exceed the per-passenger figure. Actually, the
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Any theoretical vulnerability of the tonnage formula is overcome, however,
by its pragmatic value as a mechanism most acceptable to a maximum number
of nations. Introduction of a new device, untested by any country, might not
have been as widely approved and would thus have frustrated the uniformity
goal. Moreover, whatever flaws exist in the adopted system are alleviated by
the increased limits, which guarantee adequate claimant recoveries in all but
the most calamitous maritime disasters.13 6
The major fault in the convention's tonnage plan is its failure to incorporate
an elastic standard which will automatically adjust the fund ceiling to secular
economic trends. The "sliding" scale adopted fails to achieve flexibility. Thus,
the limitation figure is stated in terms of a fixed quantity of gold-the Poin-
caire franc-which is to be translated into the currency of the forum-nation
at the commencement of each action.1 37 Supposedly, then, shifts in gold values
would alter the size of the available fund. But gold values do not ebb and flow
with the fiscal tide; world prices are "pegged" by the United States' willing-
ness to purchase gold at a stated figure.' 38 Only when this price is changed
will the recoverable amount increase.'39 This defect would not be cured by
retaining the value formula, however, for ship values are not a true indication
of business cycles. Indeed, they often decline in periods when the economy is
generally expanding. 40 Due to the extraordinary complexities of international
finance, only intense study by monetary experts could produce a truly flexible
fund limit plan. Signatory nations should underwrite such research; the only
alternative is constant modification of obsolescent fund limits.
tonnage system operates somewhat in this fashion since heavier vessels usually carry the
most passengers. But some of the most serious maritime accidents have concerned low
tonnage vessels which carried many passengers. See Hearings on H.R. 4550 Before the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 65-66 (-1935) ;
Spencer Kellog & Sons v. Hicks, 285 US. 502, 506 (1932) (86 persons aboard 45 foot
launch). See also Brussels Debates, Afternoon Sess., Oct. 1, 1957, at 14.
136. The convention was designed "to establish a ceiling which should only be
reached in rare cases of catastrophe." Brussels Debates, Afternoon Sess., Oct. 1, 1957, at
12. Even the Russians, who opposed any form of limitation for passenger claims, agreed
that the personal injury fund would be adequate in all but "the 'Titanic' and two or three
other cases." Brussels Debates, Morning Sess., Oct. 1, 1957, at 17. See also Note, 35
COLUm. L. REv. 246, 259 n.78 (1955) (listing passenger recoveries in major accidents).
Moreover, the major sea disaster is a comparatively rare occurrence. See Hearings on
H.R. 4550, supra note 135, at 78 (as of 1946 only 168 accidents throughout the world in
100 years where more than 100 people killed). And there are 7,000 personal injury claims
of an individual nature (such as a passenger or crew member tripping or falling) to one
general catastrophe. Id. at 63. See also BERNARD, op. cit. sUPra note 132, at 26 (most P.
& I. claims are for injuries to seamen).
137. Arts. 3(1), (6).
138. See SAMUELSON, EcoNomics 316-17 (4th ed. 1958).
139. Under the Warsaw Convention, which utilizes a similar recovery standard, limits
were increased from $5,000 to $8,291.67 when the United States raised the price of gold
from $20.67 to $35 an ounce. See Parker, supra note 134, at 39.
140. For the decline in ship values during relatively prosperous recent months, see
note 128 supra.
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The convention fails to stipulate whether the Poincaire franc is to be con-
verted under the forum-nation's government or market rate of gold. A West
German motion to permit translation on the basis of market was summarily
defeated, however, during the convention's closing hours. 141 And debates in-
dicate that the convention contemplated the use of "official" rates.142 But dis-
parate recoveries will obtain unless market is universally adopted and, con-
sequently, forum shopping for hard-currency nations will be encouraged. To
illustrate the problem, assume that the government of Ruritania officially
maintains that each unit of its currency-spondoolicks--contains the same
amount of gold as one Poincaire franc. Suppose further than this figure is
%, of an ounce. Presume, though, that a vendor of gold could sell one ounce
to the United States Government for thirty-five dollars, and that thirty-five
dollars at the market rate can be exchanged for seventy spondoolicks. 14 3 Ob-
viously, then, vendors will sell in the United States, since by reconverting they
can obtain twice as many spondoolicks as would have been received had they
sold directly to the Ruritanian government. Similarly, if Ruritania uses govern-
ment rates to establish the local limitation fund, plaintiffs with a claim worth
thirty-five Poincaire francs who are financially able to sue in the United States
will collect thirty-five dollars (worth seventy spondoolicks), while those forced
to sue in Ruritania will collect only thirty-five spondoolicks.
Number of Limitation Funds
The convention provides for a separate fund on each "distinct occasion" of
liability-each unrelated accident during the same voyage.144 In this area, the
major problem is determination of causal connection. Thus, if a vessel first
decimates a small fishing boat, sustaining no damage herself, and two days
later breaks in half on a sand bar, the lack of causal connection, the existence
of "distinct occasions," and the appropriateness of dual funds under the con-
vention are clear.-45 For a more realistic illustration assume that a ship's
steering mechanism is damaged in one collision, and that this defect, coupled
141. !See Brussels Debates, Afternoon Sess., Oct. 9, 1957, at 17-19 (motion defeated
7-13-8). The motion was presented to the assemblage as a permissive reservation rather
than a provision to be included within the body of the convention. Id. at 17. Some dele-
gates may have opposed the proposal on procedural rather than substantive grounds be-
cause they considered it improper in the form of a reservation. Ibid. (remarks of Mr.
Asser, Netherlands delegate) ; id. at 18 (statement of chairman that proposed reservation
doesn't require approval of substance). The United States voted for the German motion.
Ibid.
142. Britain opposed the proposal because "the market rate is quite a different thing
and I think we ought to have general agreement that the only permissible rate is the
official one." Id. at 18.
143. Some nations define the gold content of their national currency in manners not
always conforming with economic reality. See DRIoN, L mITATION OF LIABILTIES IN IN-
TERNATIONAL AIR LAW 183 (1954).
144. Art. 2(1).
145. Cf. GImuoRE & BLAcK 722.
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with additional negligence, causes a second accident before the vessel can re-
turn to port. Whether the convention contemplates that parties injured on
both occasions will be able to draw on one or separate funds is uncertain.
American precedents offer no guides, the analogous provision in the Limita-
tion Act never having been tested.14 Dual-fund construction would seem pref-
erable, though, since protection and indemnity insurance-which almost in-
variably covers as many accidents as occur during the policy period-will pre-
clude irreparable owner injury.147 Accordingly, the convention should be in-
terpreted as requiring separate funds in all borderline situations.
Distribution of the Fund
One of the unresolved problems in American limitation law is whether or
not maritime-lien priorities should be observed in the distribution of a limita-
tion fund. 48 Although the delegates at Brussels considered this problem, the
convention's language does not clearly resolve it. Article 3(2) provides that,
"the distribution among the claimants shall be made in proportion to the a-
mount of their established claims." The strikingly similar language of the
American Limitation Act-"compensation . .. in proportion to losses"'149-
has been interpreted by at least one recent treatise to allow priorities.150 Con-
vention debates, however, indicate that this result is contrary to the intent of
the draftsmenYl ' Thus, the convention provision may be subject to criticism,
since the policies that underly the creation of priorities in substantive mari-
time law would seem equally valid when the funds are paid in a limitation
146. The "distinct occasion" provision in the Limitation Act applies only to personal
injury and death claims. 49 Stat. 960 (1935), 46 U.S.C. § 183(d) (1952). Since no Ameri-
can cases have yet been decided under this clause, one treatise suggests that courts will
turn to English case law for precedents. GILmsoRE & BLACK 722. See also 3 BENEDICr
401-02. But the problem of precedents would seem to be relatively unimportant as deter-
mination of "distinct occasion" is primarily a question of fact. See also Purdy, The Re-
cent Amendment to the Maritime Limitation of Liability Statutes, 5 BROOKLYN L. REV.
42, 58 (1935).
147. See BERNARD, op. cit. supra note 132, at 51; MADRID CONFERENCE 414 (British
delegate indicates that it would not make a "pennyworth of difference" in P. & I. rates
if limitation by occasion or voyage.)
148. GILMORE & BLAK 724.
149. See Limitation Act § 184, REv. STAT. § 4284 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 184 (1952).
150. GILMORE & BLACK 724-25.
151. A motion to allow the recognition of priorities was explicitly rejected by the
conference. Brussels Debates, Afternoon Sess., Oct. 8, 1.957, at 30-31. During the discus-
sion of this motion the French delegate stated:
The question was discussed at length at Brighton, at Madrid, and right here and
each time it was clearly specified that in the case of each of the two parts of the
limitation fund, the claimants would be on an equal footing, without a privilege
rank being granted to one rather than to the other.
Id. at 30; accord, Brussels Debates, Afternoon Sess., Oct. 1, 1957, at 4 (Belgian delegate
maintains that draft disposes with preferences).
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context.15 2 But the significance of this issue is slight under the convention's
compensation system. Personal claims, which have equal lien priority, 5 3 are
satisfied from a special fund.1 4 Priority problems will arise, therefore, only
upon distribution of the property damage fund to claimants, all of whom are
usually insured. 55
International Procedures
Establishing monetary limits is, of course, only the first step in a limitation
system; unless owners are immunized from additional liability once the origi-
nal fund is exhausted, protection will be rendered illusory. And within the
context of optimum owner protection, claimant recovery should be facilitated.
Prior to the Brussels assemblage, little consideration had been given to the
problem internationally, although a number of domestic systems had been
devised.15 9 In the United States, monition and injunction have been used to
establish compulsory concourse of claims. Once proceedings are instituted, all
claimants are required to appear in the limitation forum and are enjoined from
prosecuting their actions in other courts.157 Thus, all evidence and testimony
relating to a particular accident are consolidated in a single suit.0 8 More im-
152. "If the applicable rules of law establish priorities among a debtor's creditors,
why should the unilateral act of the debtor (in filing a petition for limitation) destroy
the priorities? One might as reasonably suggest that on the filing of a petition in bank-
ruptcy secured and unsecured creditors should share alike in the debtor's assets." GIL-
moRE & BLACK 727.
153. Ibid.
154. See art. 3.
155. See GILmORE & BLACK 727.
156. The English allow an owner who has paid foreign claims to credit the amount
of those claims against the limitation fund. See MARSDEN, COLLISIONS AT SEA 202 (10th
ed. 1953). And the English courts will delay distribution until the results of the foreign
litigation are known. See ibid.
Apparently the question of a foreign claims credit has never arisen in U.S. courts.
See MLA REPORT 4250.
157. ADmiRALTY R. 51; see The Salvore, 36 F.2d 712, 714 (2d Cir. 1929).
The concourse provisions work both ways, however, and owners may be required to
forego alternate actions themselves in order to limit. See A. C. Dodge, Inc. v. Carras,
218 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1955) (owner agrees to stay Maryland action as a condition of
limiting in New York); The Quarrington Court, 102 F.2d 916, 919 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 307 U.S. 645 (1939) (owner lost the right to compel arbitration by invoking
limitation).
158. Whether this particular phase of concourse is a proper objective of a limitation
proceeding in and by itself is a matter of some dispute. At one time, the Supreme Court
described the limitation action as "equitable in its nature . . . [like] a bill to enjoin a
multiplicity of suits." Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207,
215 (1927). Recently, however, the Court noted that the shipowner gets no greater rights
than "airline, bus or railroad companies who also suffer a multiplicity of suits." Lake
Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 153 (1957). This latter position was previously
adopted by the Second Circuit, which envisions concourse primarily as a means of mar-
shalling assets rather than a device to prevent a multiplicity of suits. See Petition of
Texas Co., 213 F.2d 479, 482 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954) ; Petition
of Moran Transp. Corp., 185 F.2d 386, 388-89 (2d Cir. 1950).
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portant, after the fund has been distributed, the owner is presumably dis-
charged from responsibility toward any claimants that later appear.1 ° Never-
theless, a system of domestic concourse leaves the shipowner amenable to suit
in the courts of other countries. 160 Hence, on the international level, multiple
litigation remains likely.
Multiple Suits
Early drafts of the convention endeavored to establish a system of inter-
national concourse. All claimants, wherever situated, would have been required
to sue in the nation where limitation was first invoked. 6 ' This proposal
elicited vigorous protests from American delegates, who opposed any proce-
dure that would force United States nationals to prosecute claims on foreign
shores.10 2 Eventually the original proposal was abandoned, and article 2(4)
adopted: "After the fund has been constituted, no claimant against the fund
shall be entitled to exercise any right against any other assets of the ship-
owner . . . if the limitation fund is actually available for the benefit of the
claimant." At least one observer has assumed that this ambiguous provision
contemplates a worldwide monition and injunction by the fund-court. 63 The
convention intended, however, to jettison international concourse. 64 Creating
a limitation fund in a foreign nation should not, therefore, foreclose American
159. See 3 BENEDICT 543. See also Dowdell v. United States Dist. Ct., 139 Fed. 444,
445 (9th Cir. 1905) ; The Adab, 258 Fed. 377, 381 (2d Cir. 1919).
160. Cf. In re Dulles' Settlement (No. 2), [1951] Ch. 842 (judgment has no effect
on person outside the jurisdiction).
An American claimant who is subject to the court's jurisdiction will be prohibited
from instituting a suit based on the same cause of action in some foreign forum. While
the court cannot enjoin a foreign action, it could presumably punish the individual. Cf.
38 YALE LJ. 261, 262 (1928) ("A person within equity's jurisdiction may be enjoined
from doing any act even outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court.").
161. The draft convention adopted at Madrid provided that "after the establishment
of the limitation fund no right can be exercised relating to claims for which the ship-
owner is entitled to limit his liability against any other of his assets." MADRID CONFER-
ENcE 578. In order to -prevent the owner from establishing the fund in completely un-
accessible locations, article 1. of the Madrid draft enumerated alternative locations where
the fund might be established. Id. at 582.
162. "The provision which requires all things to be enforced in that forum chosen
by the owner is not acceptable to the United States . . . . [T]he forum should be as
much a matter of right for the claimant, who, after all, is the injured person, rather than
being solely the right of the shipowner." Statement of American Delegate, Brussels De-
bates, Afternoon Sess., Oct. 1, 1957, at 16.
163. See MLA REPORT 4249 ("If the injunction of the court having jurisdiction of
the limitation proceeding is recognized by Courts of other contracting nations . . . suit
by claimants elsewhere will be prevented.").
164. See U.S. Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law, Official
Report, Nov. 18, 1957, p. 5 ("Another amendment will permit claimants to sue in the
courts of their own country, rather than being compelled to bring their action in the
jurisdiction where the shipowner chooses to file a proceeding, to limit his liability.").
This position is also supported by Statement of E. Robert Seaver, MLA REPORT 4268.
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claimants from access to domestic courts. Thus, while owner protection would
be ensured by international concourse, these benefits are countervailed by the
system's prejudicial effect on claimants who lack the means to institute for-
eign suits.16 5
Although article 2 (4) allows accident victims to litigate claims in the courts
of their home countries, its ambiguities undercut the utility of this privilege.
Under the interpretation adopted by the British when the convention was in-
corporated into national law, constitution of a limitation fund in one nation
precludes claimant recoveries from any other source. 16 In article 2(4) terms,
once a claim is reduced to judgment anywhere, it becomes a "claim against
the fund," and "no other assets" may be attached while the fund is "actually
available." If this construction is accepted by the United States, a suit could
be prosecuted under American substantive law, but the judgment would be
enforceable only in the fund nation.167
While the British interpretation finds some support in convention de-
bates,' 68 it should be rejected for the same reasons that led to repudiation of
See also id. at 4263 (convention actually invites claimants to bring suits wherever they
please).
The British also seem to have accepted this interpretation by allowing claimants to
file their claims in Britain although a fund is constituted elsewhere. See note 166 infra
and accompanying text.
The Brussels provision can be contrasted with the Rome Convention of 1952 which
explicitly prevents suits against air carriers in any nation except the one where the ac-
cident occurred. See DRioN, op. cit. supra note 143, at 338.
165. Suits in foreign nations by American claimants would involve expenses and com-
plexities not present in domestic litigation. See Comment, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 377 (1958).
166. Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz.
2, c. 62, § 6(1):
No judgment or decree for a claim founded on a liability to which a limit is set
... shall be enforced, except so far as it is for costs, . . . if security for an amount
not less than the said limit has been given, whether in the United Kingdom or
elsewhere, in respect of the liability or any other liability incurred on the same
occasion and the court is of opinion that the security is satisfactory and is satisfied
that the amount for which it was given or such part thereof as corresponds to the
claim will be actually available to the person in whose favour the judgment or
decree was given or made.
For a discussion of the "actually available" clause, see note 171 infra.
Great Britain has not adopted the convention as such, but has altered its existing law
to conform to convention provisions, and is thus considered to be a ratifying nation. Great
Britain filed instruments of ratification at Brussels. See Letter From John W. Mann,
Ass't Chief, Shipping Division, Dep't of State, to Yale Law Journal, May 13, 1959, on
file in Yale Law Library. Since Britain is a ratifying party and since the aims of the
convention's art. 2(4) and the English statute's § 6(1) seem to be the same, the latter
provision is undoubtedly an interpretation of the former.
167. This problem may be less acute than it appears since there is some indication
that in most large maritime disasters shipowners constitute the fund in the United States.
See MDA REPORT 4262.
168. During the debates on art. 5, which prevents multiple arrests, see note 202 infra
and accompanying text, it was claimed that art. 5 complemented art. 2, since both pre-
1704 [Vol. 68:1676
BRUSSELS CONVENTION
international concourse. A local litigant attempting to collect a judgment in
an alien tribunal may encounter difficulties equal to those confronting a suitor
forced to prosecute his entire claim abroad.16 9 Generally, absent explicit re-
ciprocity agreements, many courts will either refuse recognition to, or scale
down, awards made by foreign courts.170 Thus, litigants may be subjected to
a trial de novo even though they have already obtained foreign judgments.
True, the "actually available" clause might be interpreted to allow local judg-
ment collection if foreign enforcement is not forthcoming.' 7 ' But this would
still subject claimants to the expense and inconvenience of additional litigation,
unless it can be determined in advance that the fund forum will not honor
foreign judgments. Had the convention provided a method of international
judgment enforcement, local litigants could avoid the uncertainties of the
British approach; but the draftsmen considered this problem beyond the scope
of their authority.17 2 As presently conceived, then, claimants may be forced to
cluded claimants from forcing the shipowner to establish funds in more than one country,
see Brussels Debates, Afternoon Sess., Oct. 8, 1957, at 7, 15; Brussels Debates, Morn-
ing Sess., Oct. 8, 1957, at 22 (Israeli delegate says art. 2 protects owners "so that they
are not compelled to set up limitation funds at various places or be liable to be sued and
to have to pay at various jurisdictions").
169. See DRION, Op. cit. supra note 143, at 338 ("Execution of foreign judgments is
a subject ... beset with difficulties").
170. See GILMORE & BLACK 725 (limitation decrees do not receive international
recognition) ; Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judgments: A Historical-
Critical Analysis, 16 LA. L. REv. 465, 480 (1956) ; Lenhoff, Reciprocity in Function: A
Problem of Conflict of Laws, Constitutional Law, and International Law, 15 U. Pirr. L.
REv. 44, 64 (1953) (law of the forum may "condition its good-neighborly attitude upon
the reciprocal conduct of the foreign state") ; Reese, The Statits in This Country of
Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 783, 789 (1950) ; Schneeberger, Reci-
procity as a Maxim of International Law, 37 GEo. L.J. 29 (1948). But cf. Applewhaite
v. The S.S. Sunprincess, 150 F. Supp. 827, 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (court refuses to re-
examine foreign settlement "because of considerations of international comity and ex-
pediency"). See generally Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Clains
and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087 (1956). Britain
automatically recognizes foreign admiralty judgments even absent reciprocity. See MARS-
DEN, op. cit. supra note 156, at 242.
Also, some courts might consider limitation actions as claims against a fund-res and
afford the judgments the usual validity afforded foreign admiralty in rem proceedings.
Cf. GILMORE & BLACK 640-41; Reese, supra at 791.
171. The "actually available" clause was apparently inserted to allow claimants
against a fund to attack other owner assets if the fund became unavailable because of
currency restrictions, war or other contingencies. See Brussels Debates, Afternoon Sess.,
Oct. 1, 1957, at 10-1.1. See also The Ioannis P. Goulandris, 140 F.2d 780, 782 n.2 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755 (1944) (shipowner raises frozen funds argument). But
its scope was never fully discussed.
172. The United States introduced a motion which would have required the courts
of nations where bail was furnished under art. 5 to recognize the judgments of other
courts but it was defeated. See Brussels Debates, Afternoon Sess., Oct. 8, 1957, at 9, 11.
Defeat was largely due to the resistance of British and French delegates who were op-
posed to discussing matters of judgment enforcement. "You cannot possibly force upon
the jurisdiction of the first arrest the decision of the court of the jurisdiction of the
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relitigate their entire action in a foreign forum, and the ghost of international
concourse will continue to haunt limitation law.
Should the United States ratify the convention, it can avoid the conse-
quences flowing from this "single fund" doctrine by attaching an interpreta-
tion to article 2(4).173 The prohibition therein against distraint of nonfund
assets is directed solely towards "claimants against the fund." 174 Murky at
best, this phrase could be construed as including only persons suing within the
fund nation, for in a narrow sense they alone are "claiming against the
fund."'1 75 Hence, both right and remedy will be available to American nation-
als in local courts. Though arguably inconsistent with other provisions which
apparently contemplate only one fund,1 76 such an interpretation is justifiable
in the interests of claimant protection. Moreover, this construction is con-
sistent with that part of the convention which seemingly anticipates claims
being paid worldwide.1' 7 And it leaves article 2(4) with a meaning compatible
with convention goals; once the fund is distributed, suitors are prevented from
seeking further awards through suits in nonfund forums.178
second arrest. Otherwise, you get into terrible trouble." Statement of British Delegate,
id. at 10. "In this Convention relating to limitation you are being asked to determine
when the decisions of foreign courts in other countries are to be binding. This is a ques-
tion which cannot be submitted to you .. . . [I]t is not within the province of our Con-
ference to consider it." Statement by French Delegate, id. at 11.
173. The United States may interpret the convention in enabling legislation in the
same manner that the British have done. See Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz.
2, c. 62.
174. See art. 2(4).
175. "I would assume ... that it [art. 2(4)] would not preclude a person who has
not asserted a claim against the fund from suing in some other jurisdiction." Statement
of Clarence G. Morse, Federal Maritime Administrator (iChairman, United States Dele-
gation), Brussels Debates, Afternoon Sess., Oct. 8, 1957, at 7.
176. Art. 5 in particular seems to comprehend the establishment of only one fund.
Other references to a single fund can be found in arts. 2(2), 4.
177. Art. 3(4) permits the owner to credit against the fund amounts he has paid
claimants in other nations. Mr. Matteson argued that:
The provisions of Art. 3(4) protecting the shipowner in case of payment of a for-
eign liability are not inconsistent with this view [that art. 2(4) applies to all
claims wherever situated,] since they may and would apply to liability incurred in
a nonadherent state, and may also apply in the event a court of some adherent
state might take a view at variance with the above.
MLA RFPORT 4250. But art. 3(4) refers specifically to claims paid under art. 1(1.)
which in turn refers to limitation "in accordance with .. . this Convention." Thus, it
might be argued that the section was intended to apply to judgments paid in convention
-nations as well as those paid elsewhere. The United States delegation apparently accepted
this interpretation as they viewed the foreign credit as an alternative to international con-
course. See Brussels Debates, Afternoon Sess., Oct. 1, 1957, at 16.
In any event, Matteson seems to concede that the United States could adopt a "variant"
view which would allow claimants to recover judgments in this country notwithstanding
the establishment of a fund in some other nation.
178. This interpretation would answer the objections that the convention destroys
domestic concourse, see MLA REPORT 4263, since it ensures that injunctions against
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Although the British interpretation prohibiting judgment collection in a non-
fund nation should not be adopted in the United States and elsewhere, other
convention provisions might possibly overcome the problems it was designed
to resolve. In the past, the existence of more than one fund occasionally re-
sulted in owner payments exceeding established limits, and always involved
the expense of maintaining large monetary deposits, or posting bonds, through-
out the world. This latter evil could not previously be avoided, for many
nations demanded that the total fund be paid into court, or that a bond be
posted, as a condition precedent to limitation.179 But under the convention,
the deposit problem can be substantially eliminated if the establishment of a
full fund in one signatory nation were deemed sufficient security for the in-
vocation of limitation in the courts of all other adherents.8 0 Indeed, this in-
terpretation would rationalize various convention references to a single fund.' 8 '
Unfortunately, preventing owner liability greater than the tonnage formula
will prove more difficult. The convention provides for a "foreign claims credit"
which is apparently designed to avoid over-ceiling payments. 8 2 The forum
is required to offset the pro rata share that foreign claimants who have already
been paid would have received had they sued locally,1 3 and is permitted (but
not required) to set aside a sufficient amount to cover future foreign claims.' 84
But even in the simplest case-invocation of the credit in a fund court ' 85
-the branch of this scheme dealing for future claims fails as an operative
solution. Assuming that the court is willing to apply the foreign credit, 8 6 it
may be unable to do so. The convention does not provide a time limit for in-
stituting damage suits, but incorporates the rules of the nation where suit is
brought.8 7 And if the laws of the various claimant nations provide for rela-
claimants subject to the jurisdiction of the concourse-court will be enforced. Moreover,
the Report's contention is unsupportable in light of art. 4's provision that "the rules
relating to the constitution and distribution of the limitation fund, if any, and all rules
of procedure shall be governed by the national law of the State in which the fund is con-
stituted."
179. See ADAURALTY R. 51 (United States) ; Brussels Debates, Afternoon Sess. Oct.
1, 1957, at 8 (Britain); ibid. (Netherlands). But see id. at 5 (in Sweden fund not con-
dition precedent to limitation).
180. This interpretation would be consistent with art. 5, which was designed to
relieve the owner from the burden of establishing more than one fund. If, however, this
proposal is disadvantageous to claimants because a particular owner does not seem to
have sufficient assets to satisfy a judgment rendered against him, then the "actually avail-
able" clause might be utilized in the same manner suggested for art. 5. See text accom-
panying note 213 infra.




185. The "fund-court" refers to the court in which the fund is first constituted.
186. Only England has previously used this system. See note 156 supra. See also 68
HARv. L. REv. 706, 703 (1955).
187. Art. 5(5). See also art. 4.
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tively long periods of time, the owner will probably be unable to prove the
existence of future foreign claims to the fund court's satisfaction before the
limitation proceeding terminates. 88 Arguably, this problem is mooted by pro-
visions in shipowner contracts restricting the time for filing claims.'80 But the
enforceability of private statutes of limitation varies from nation to nation and
is subject to unilateral change at any time.190 And, even if these clauses were
universally enforceable, only parties contractually related to the limiting owner
are bound thereby. Claimants on other ships and shorebound victims remain
subject solely to the general statute of limitations, or the doctrine of laches,
depending on the law of the nation in which they sue.191
Since the owner will be unable to prove future foreign claims, the fund
court must either ignore them, and thus make over-ceiling owner payments
likely, or attempt to estimate them. Overestimation will harm fund-nation
claimants; underestimations will damage owners. A method of prediction
which will reconcile claimant and owner interests is necessary.
When the initial limitation proceeding is concluded, the court should first
add all claims successfully prosecuted in the forum to all foreign judgments
already obtained. Then, it should estimate, using, perhaps, predictive tech-
niques developed by American admiralty courts,192 the extent of anticipated
foreign claims. At this point, estimates should be made as liberally as possible;
the owner's allegation should be given a presumption of correctness. judg-
ments should then be partially liquidated and the balance of the owner's bond
will represent the predicted foreign credit. As foreign claims are paid and
proved, the bond will be correspondingly reduced. If, after a reasonable time
has elapsed, foreign payments have not equalled the bond, the owner will
188. The -necessity for a time limit to ensure the effectiveness of credit provisions has
been noted before. See 68 HARv. L. REv. 706, 708 (1955).
189. See, e.g., clause 10 of the ticket reproduced in Siegelman v. Cunard White Star,
Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 209 (2d Cir. 1955).
190. In the United States ticket stipulations are invalid when applied to personal in-
jury and death claims if they provide for notice periods shorter than six months and
require suits to be instituted before one year. See Limitation Act § 183b, 49 Stat. 960
(1935), 46 U.S.C. § 183b (1952). Until the act was passed such stipulations were valid.
See Hubbard v. Matson Nay. Co., 34 Cal. App. 2d 475, 476-77, 93 P.2d 846, 847 (1939),
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 628 (1940) (citing cases). See also 36 MICH. L. REV. 136 (1937).
For the law of other countries see MLA REPoRT 4259 (stipulations valid in Britain) ;
Mulvihill v. Furness, Withy & Co., 136 F. Supp. 201, 203 (,S.D.N.Y. 1955) (provisions
of ticket assume that stipulation probably valid everywhere except United States) ; Witte
v. Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Stoomvart Maatschappiaj, 96 F. Supp. 485, 486 (D.N.J.
1951.) (same); Rosenthal v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 14 F.R.D. 33 (SD.
N.Y. 1953).
191. In the United States, for example, marine claims are measured by laches unless
the suit is brought under a particular statute such as the Jones Act. See GILmORE &
BLACK 295-96, 630, 634-37.
192. Under the Limitation Act concourse is denied unless the total amount of claims
exceeds the owner's limit. See GILMORPE & BLACK 687-90. When computing the total a-
mount of claims a court must consider claims which may be filed in the future. See
Petition of Trinidad Corp., 229 F.2d 423, 429 (2d Cir. 1955).
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liquidate the remainder, and forum claimants will receive a supplementary
distribution. 1 3
Invoking the foreign credit in a nonfund nation 194 presents additional diffi-
culties. The convention refers only to credits against a "fund." 10o Arguably,
when there is no fund, a court is not required to consider even foreign awards.
This interpretation, however, would lead to ludicrous results. Suppose, for
example, that a claimant sues in a nation where no other actions have been
instituted. Since his claim will almost certainly be less than the owner's total
limited liability, a court ignoring foreign payments already made would grant
full compensation. Should this be the rule, each claimant would try to find
a forum in which he could sue alone.' 96 Not only would this be manifestly
unfair to those parties financially unable to seek a favorable jurisdiction, but
it would destroy the convention's usefulness in international accommodation
and owner protection.
Admittedly, the patent undesirability of this result may indicate that the
convention never contemplated judgment collection in nonfund countries. 197
On the other hand, the foreign credit provisions might mean that each forum-
nation is to establish a separate fund. 98 The references in the credit provision
to "setting aside a portion of the fund" could be viewed, however, as alluding
to an amount of money paid into court after judgment has been rendered
locally. Since there will be nothing to set aside as representing the share
accorded foreign claims without a fund, the credit amount must be paid into
court, or a bond posted, at the conclusion of domestic litigation. As the owner
proves actual foreign payment, he is to be reimbursed.
-193. A similar system obtains in bankruptcy proceedings with regard to unclaimed
funds; the court retains jurisdiction for five years. See Bankruptcy Act § 66, 30 Stat.
564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1952), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp.
V, 1958); 28 U.S.C. § 2042 (1952). See also Greene, Admiralty Law--An Overall
Picture, 1958 INs. L.J. 253, 254 (comparing limitation proceedings to bankruptcy).
Arguably, claimants will be disadvantaged by losing the right to challenge the authen-
ticity of foreign claims. See Petition of Trinidad Corp., 229 F.2d 423, 428 (2d Cir. 1955)
(concourse allows claimants to minimize competing claims). But the opportunity is pres-
ently lost whenever an owner makes an out-of-court settlement. Claimants can, however,
challenge the reasonableness of the settlement. See id. at 429. See also Applewhaite v.
The S.S. Sunprincess, 150 F. Supp. 827, 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (refusing to review for-
eign settlement). A similar remedy can be provided for the foreign claim.
194. A "nonfund" nation is one that does not require the establishment of a fund as
a condition precedent to limitation.
195. Art. 3(3) (4).
196. The MLA Report suggests that claimants not prohibited from bringing suits by
art. H1(4) may not even be subject to limitation. MLA REPoRT 4250. This interpretation
seems to be completely disproved by the British statute, which applies limitation to claims
brought within England although the fund is constituted elsewhere. See note 166 supra
and accompanying text.
A claimant usually cannot sue in more than one nation at the same time. See MARs-
DEN, COLLISIONS AT SEA 241 (10th ed. 1953) ; note 160 supra.
197. See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
198. See note 180 supra and accompanying text.
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Superficially, this plan restores the multifund procedure which existed prior
to the convention. Unlike prior law, however, the fund will represent only the
amount of unsatisfied claims, and need not be established before trial. More-
over, the size of the nonfund court "fund" will be substantially less than 207
dollars per ton, and many foreign payments will be proved concurrently with
the conclusion of local proceedings.
Propounding procedures is one thing, implementing them another. The
precatory and uncertain nature of the credit for future foreign claims may well
nullify shipowner benefit. To illustrate, assume that the tonnage formula pro-
duces a limitation figure of 200, and that a fund of that amount is constituted
in country X. Assume also that claims for that amount are filed there and that
claims later will arise for an additional 200 in Y. If the X court refuses the
credit because, for example, X does not recognize the substantive basis of the
Y claims, 199 or errs in predicting Y claims, the owner's foreign liability will
be recognized as less than the actual total of 200. Suppose that the credit
granted is fifty, which would be consolidated with the 200 in claims filed
locally. The recovery ratio would then be eighty per cent (200 local claims/
250 total). Domestically, this would produce recoveries of 160. When, during
litigation in Y, the owner seeks to credit damages he paid in X, the Y court
will face the difficult task of determining the extent of his X credit in light of
the imperfect application of the Y credit in X.
If the Y court treats claims paid in X-160--as if they were before the
forum, it would treat total claims as 360. A Y litigant would therefore receive
only 20%60, or fifty-six per cent of his claim. Opposition would doubtless be
forthcoming from both shipowner and Y claimant. The owner would insist
that since the convention limits his liability to 200, and he has already paid
160, Y suitors are entitled only to forty (4%oo, or twenty per cent of their
claims). But this result is too prejudicial to local claimants to be probable.
Y claimants, on the other hand, will most likely insist upon the maintenance
of international parity, i.e., the same eighty per cent recovery granted in X.
In order to prevent the errors of one nation from infecting the awards of
199. Art. 3(3) limits the credit to amounts "that the claimant whose claim [the
owner] has paid would have had a right of recovery against him under the national law
of the State where the fund has been constituted." Under this provision, if A sues owner
in the United States, recovering $10,000, and the laws of the fund-nation would have
allowed recovery of only $5,000, A's claim can be credited only to the extent of this
latter amount. Understandably, an assembly concerned with limitation hesitated to inter-
fere with what it considered to be substantive rules of liability. But as a result, the com-
plexities arising from the international divergence of collision liability formulas, see GIL-
moR & BLACK 438-42; GRIFFIN, AMEmRCAN LAw oi" COLLISION 565-66 (Knauth ed.
1949) ; Staring, Contribution and Division of Damages in Admiralty and Maritine Cases,
45 CALIF. L. Ray. 304 (1957), are imported into both the present and future credit pro-
visions.
The resultant confusion can be ameliorated if courts adopt conflict of laws rules that




all others, courts should apply the foreign credit on the basis of claims filed
in other countries, irrespective of the recovery ratio there employed. Thus,
in the hypothetical, the Y court would regard the action as if 400 in claims
were filed against a fund of 200. Each claimant in Y would therefore receive
a fifty per cent recovery-or a total of 100. True, the shipowner would still
pay over his limit to the extent of the errors of any nation. But this method
clearly represents the intention of the draftsmen, since, if applied accurately
by every court, total liability will exactly equal the convention limit,2°° al-
though uniform and unerring application seems pragmatically doubtful.
Arrest
Although the convention does not effectively protect the owner from mul-
tiple litigation, it does prevent the arrest of his ship in each potential forum.
If the ship is initially impounded in a country where the bail furnished is
"actually available" to claimants, the courts of nations where the vessel is sub-
sequently arrested must release it without additional security.2 01 Although this
provision was designed primarily to ensure uninterrupted voyages, 20 2 all but
the arresting court, according to one view, are thereby stripped of jurisdic-
tion.2 03 Thus, claimants would be forced to bring suit in a foreign land. In
support, this view cites the defeat of an American motion which would have
specifically allowed the releasing court to retain jurisdiction if the initial bail
was deposited in an inconvenient forum.2 04 Actually, though, debates reveal
200. The system would work perfectly even if more than two nations were involved.
Assume four nations with 200 claims filed in each and a total limit under the conven-
tion of 100. Each nation would grant claimants 10%oo, or 1232% of their claims. Thus,
the amount paid in each nation would be 25 (1231% of 200), with an overall total equal-
ing 100.
201. Art. 5.
202. See Brussels Debates, Afternoon Sess., Oct. 8, 1957, at 14 (remarks of Nor-
wegian delegate). The great inconvenience of multiple arrests is that the vessel must
cease operation until a bond is posted. See Mangone v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.,
152 F. Supp. 848, 854 (E.D.N.Y. 1957). See also 6 BENEDICT 9 (international convention
on arrest).
The addition of "property" as well as ships to the arrest provisions seems to have
been an afterthought. See Brussels Debates, supra at 15. See also 40 H~av. L. REv. 314
(1926).
203. See MLA REPoRT 4249, 4250. The Report additionally argued that in rem juris-
diction cannot exist without control of the res. Id. at 4250.
204. The serious possibility that claimant [sic] will be prevented even from bringing
suit in another jurisdiction to establish their claims is emphasized by the opposition
to, and defeat of, Mr. Houston's clarifying amendment to make the right of claim-
ants to sue elsewhere to establish their claims clear.
Id. at 4249. The American motion reads as follows:
If a court orders the release of a ship or bail under any of the circumstances men-
tioned [in art. 5] such court may nevertheless adjudicate the merits of the claim
of claimants if it is of the opinion that the forum in which the bail or other
security is given is not a convenient forum for the adjudication of such claims. Any
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that the proposed amendment was rejected only because delegates believed
that the second court would always have jurisdiction, whether or not the first
forum is inconvenient .=' Thus, the releasing forum's jurisdiction is left to the
requirements of national law.
2 0 6
United States law will allow retention of jurisdiction even after the ship's
release. Admiralty courts can retain in rem jurisdiction after a limitation
petition has been filed although they no longer control the res.2 0 7 Even absent
a limitation petition, the owner's motion to have the ship released could pos-
sibly be treated as a personal appearance allowing in personam jurisdiction.2 08
In any event, Congress could adopt the English practice of statutorily requir-
ing the owner to submit to the court's jurisdiction as a condition precedent
to release.20 9
With jurisdiction retained, American claimants will not be seriously dis-
advantaged by the ship's release. Once judgment is rendered, other owner
assets may be attached.2 10 Hence, unless the owner has terminated all opera-
final decision of such court shall be recognized as enforceable by the court in which
the prior bail or security has been lodged.
Brussels Debates, Afternoon Sess., Oct. 8, 1957, at 2.
205. See remarks of British delegate, id. at 9:
If a tribunal in whose jurisdiction a vessel has been arrested decides under the
Convention to release the vessel from arrest, the question whether that tribunal
can or cannot try the action, is we would say, on its merits, it is a question of local
law entirely. The fact that the vessel has been released from arrest may not in
some jurisdictions-it certainly would not in ours-prevent the court from trying
the action on its merits ... . If you put this [the American motion] in the Con-
vention, it means that the court in whose jurisdiction the ship is released from a
second arrest can only exercise the jurisdiction it may have had for centuries if
it is satisfied that the place where the fund was put up is not a fit place to try
the action .... I may have misunderstood the purpose of the amendment ...but
it seems to me that far from increasing the jurisdiction of the court of the place
of the second arrest, it curtails it.
206. Ibid.
207. See In re Morrison, 147 U.S. 14, 23-26 (1893) (filing of libel gave court juris-
diction which couldn't be lost by removing ship); cf. In the Matter of Wood, 124 F.
Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). Or, the court could retain jurisdiction on equitable grounds.
See Just v. Chambers, 312 US. 383, 386 ('1941) ; Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207, 21S, 217 (1927). See also The Nettie Moore, 270 Fed. 1005
(D. Md. 1921). But cf. The Chickie, 141 F.2d 80, 85 (3d Cir. 1944).
208. See CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 110 (5th ed. 1957) (if owner of
arrested ship gives bail he submits himself to jurisdiction of the court). But see The
City of Singapore, 68 F. Supp. 164, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (filing of claim to libeled
vessel together with answer did not give court in personam jurisdiction).
209. Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz.
2, c. 62, § 5(1.) ("[W]here the release is ordered the person on whose application it is
ordered shall be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate
on the claim . . . ."). This provision has been characterized as "remarkable" Kahn-
Freund, Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1958, 21 MoDEit
L. REv. 645, 646 (1958).
210. This statement assumes, of course, that the British interpretation of art. 11(4),
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tions prior to judgment, one of his ships will almost certainly appear in the
United States within a reasonable time n.2 1 Indeed, most large shipowners do
a continuing business here, so that assets will always be readily available to
judgment creditors. 212 On occasion, the release provisions may in fact increase
claimant recoveries by allowing shipowners to maintain normal operations in
a strong charter market. A continuing profit flow is thus ensured and, accord-
ingly, the shipowner's ability to satisfy judgment is buttressed. But if domestic
judgments are unenforceable in the fund nation, or can be collected only with
difficulty, American courts might invoke the "actually available" clause and
refuse release.2 1 3 On the other hand, if the United States enters reciprocity
agreements allowing claimants to obtain automatic enforcement of their judg-
ments, 214 release should be granted without bail as a matter of course.
CONCLUSION
Largely outmoded in an age of insurance, limitation is justified primarily
by considerations of international parity. If the United States were unilaterally
to abolish limitation, American interests would be jeopardized. While limita-
tion might also be denied foreign shipowners in American courts,216 foreign
nations could retaliate .2 1 Moreover, international tensions created by Ameri-
can denial of limitation to foreigners might force the United States eventually
to recognize other nations' limitation statutes, particularly when no American
claimants were involved.21 7 In either event, American owners would experi-
ence disproportionate insurance rate increases, and would be forced to raise
see note 166 supra and accompanying text, is rejected. Once a judgment is rendered by
any district court sitting in admiralty, the judgment may be registered and enforced in
any other district court. See AmnRALTY R. 22; 28 U.S.C. § 1963 ('Supp. V, 1958);
MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE JUDICIAL CODE 382-85 (1949).
211. Cf. British Transp. Comm'n v. United States, 354 U.S. 129, 142 (1957).
212. See Note, 66 YALE L.J. 121, 129 (1956).
213. See note 171 supra.
214. See Honig, Reciprocal Recognition and Eforcenent of Foreign Judgments, 107
L.J. 787, 789 (1957) ; Nadelmann, Reprisals Against American Judgments, 65 HAR. L.
REV. 1184, 1191 (1952).
215. Cf. Springer, Amendments to the Federal Law Limiting the Liability of Ship-
owners, 11 ST. JonNs L. REv. 14, 26 (1936) (no competitive disadvantage from increased
limits since American Act applies to foreign owners).
216. See Petition of United States for Certiorari, p. 18, Black Diamond S.S. Corp.
v. Robert Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386 (1949) (discussing reprisal in connection with
application of Limitation Act to foreign owners) ; cf. Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law
of Foreign Judgments: A Historical-Critical Analysis, 16 LA. L. REv. 465, 466 (1956)
(reprisal part of notion of reciprocity). But cf. Reply Brief, p. 6, Black Diamond S.S.
Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sons, supra (discounting possibility of reprisals among allies).
217. Even the courts have noted the unfairness of depriving a shipowner of his na-
tional limitation statute. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 US. 571, 591-92 (1953) ("Because
a law of the forum is applied to plaintiffs who voluntarily submit themselves to it is no
argument for imposing the law of the forum upon those who do not.") (dictum) ; British
Transp. Comm'n v. United States, 354 U.S. 129, 143-46 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
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passenger and cargo rates to noncompetitive levels. 218 The resultant decrease
in profits would have to be compensated by subsidies if the present flight to
flags of convenience were not to be spurred. Arguably, subsidies should be
paid from the general coffers rather than the pockets of injured claimants.2 1 0
But this approach overlooks the advantages to be garnered from the adoption
of an internationally uniform law. Admittedly, uniformity alone is not suffi-
cient justification for the adoption of unwise policies. But if uniformity is a-
chieved through statutory provisions which markedly increase claimant pro-
tection in all nations, though the increase is not as large as might be achieved
by unilateral action, such uniform rules would appear desirable.
The Brussels Convention offers a needed uniform increase in fund limits,
but the tendency of the participants to minimize or ignore areas of conflict
resulted in ambiguities and contradictions which threaten both claimant and
owner protection. Fortunately, the convention's language is flexible enough to
permit congressional interpretations which may eliminate some of the conven-
tion's weaknesses.
Uninterpreted, the convention should be rejected. If, on the other hand, the
suggested constructions are accepted, adoption of the convention would have
its greatest impact on American law through increase in limits. This result,
while desirable, might have been achieved by simply amending the Limitation
Act. Moreover, interpretations of the" convention will undoubtedly differ sub-
stantially from nation to nation, thereby eliminating any likelihood that mean-
ingful uniformity will be achieved. Ratification can be justified, therefore, only
by its effects on other nations. Countries favorably disposed towards the Brus-
sels draft may hesitate to ratify before the convention is accepted by the major
maritime powers. If they are induced to ratify by American example, and
follow American interpretations, a foundation might be laid for a future in-
ternational agreement which will provide truly universal limitation law.
APPENDIx A
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION RELATING TO THE LIMITATION OF
THE LIABILITY OF OWNERS OF SEAGOING SHIPS
Article 1
(1) The owner of a seagoing ship may limit his liability in accordance with Article 3
of this Convention in respect of claims arising from any of the following occurrences,
unless the occurrence giving rise to the claim resulted from the actual fault or privity of
the owner:
(a) Loss of life of, or personal injury to, any person being carried in the ship,
and loss of, or damage to, any property on board the ship;
218. See Kuhn, International Aspects of the Titanic Case, 9 Am. J. INT'L L. 336,
348 (1.915) ; note 55 sztpra and accompanying text.
219. 'See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
See also note 2 supra.
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(b) Loss of life of, or personal injury to, any other person whether on land or on
water, loss of or damage to any other property or infringement of any rights
caused by the act, neglect or default of any person on board the ship for whose
act, neglect or default the owner is responsible or any person not on board the
ship for whose act, neglect or default the owner is responsible: Provided how-
ever that in regard to the act, neglect or default of this last class of person,
the owner shall only be entitled to limit his liability when the act, neglect or
default is one which occurs in the navigation or the management of the ship
or in the loading, carriage or discharge of its cargo or in the embarkation,
carriage or disembarkation of its passengers.
(c) Any obligation or liability imposed by any law relating to the removal of wreck
and arising from or in connection with the raising, removal or destruction of
any ship which is sunk, stranded or abandoned (including anything which may
be on board such ship) and any obligation or liability arising out of damage
caused to harbour works, basins and navigable waterways.
(2) In the present Convention the expression "personal claims" means claims resulting
from loss of life and personal injury: the expression "property claims" means all
other claims set out in paragraph (1) of this Article.
(3) An owner shall be entitled to limit his liability in the cases set out in paragraph
(1) of this Article even in cases where his liability arises, without proof of negli-
gence on the part of the owner or of persons for whose conduct he is responsible,
by reason of his ownership, possession, custody or control of the ship.
(4) Nothing in this Article shall apply:
(a) to claims for salvage or to claims for contribution in general average.
(b) To claims by the Master, by members of the crew, by any servants of the owner
on board the ship or by servants of the owner whose duties are connected with
the ship, including the claims of their heirs, personal representatives or de-
pendents, if under the law governing the contract of service between the owner
and such servants the owner is not entitled to limit his liability in respect of
such claims or if he is by such law only permitted to limit his liability to an
amount greater than that provided for in Article 3 of this Convention.
(5) If the owner of a ship is entitled to make a claim against a claimant arising out of
the same occurrence, their respective claims shall be set off against each other and
the provisions of this Convention shall only apply to the balance, if any.
(6) The question upon whom lies the burden of proving whether or not the occurrence
giving rise to the claim resulted from the actual fault or privity of the owner shall
be determined by the lex fori.
(7) The act of invoking limitation of liability shall not constitute an admission of lia-
bility.
Article 2
(1) The limit of liability prescribed by Article 3 of this Convention shall apply to the
aggregate of personal claims and property claims which arise on any distinct occasion
without regard to any claims which have arisen or may arise on any other distinct
occasion.
(2) When the aggregate of the claims which arise on any distinct occasion exceeds the
limits of liability provided for by Article 3, the total sum representing such limits
of liability may be constituted as one distinct limitation fund.
(3) The fund thus constituted shall be available only for the payment of claims in re-
spect of which limitation of liability can be invoked.
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(4) After the fund has been constituted, no claimant against the fund shall be entitled
to exercise any right against any other assets of the shipowner in respect of his
claim against the fund, if the limitation fund is actually available for the benefit of
the claimant.
Article 3
(1) The amounts to which the owner of a ship may limit his liability under Article 1
shall be:
(a) Where the occurrence has only given rise to property claims, an aggregate
amount of 1000 francs for each ton of the ship's tonnage;
(b) Where the occurrence has only given rise to personal claims, an aggregate
amount of 3,100 francs for each ton of the ship's tonnage;
(c) Where the occurrence has given rise both to personal claims and property
claims an aggregate amount of 3,100 francs for each ton of the ship's tonnage,
of which a first portion amounting to 2100 francs for each ton of the ship's
tonnage shall be exclusively appropriated to the payment of personal claims
and of which a second portion amounting to 1000 francs for each ton of the
ship's tonnage shall be appropriated to the payment of property claims, pro-
vided however that in cases where the first portion is insufficient to pay the
personal claims in full, the unpaid balance of such claims shall rank rateably
with the property claims for payment against the second portion of the fund.
(2) In each portion of the limitation fund the distribution among the claimants shall be
made in proportion to the amounts of their established claims.
(3) If before the fund is distributed the owner has paid in whole or part any of the
claims set out in Article 1 paragraph (1) he shall pro tanto be placed in the same
position in relation to the fund as the claimant whose claim he has paid, but only
to the extent that the claimant whose claim he has paid would have had a right of
recovery against him under the national law of the State where the fund has been
constituted.
(4) Where the shipowner establishes that he may at a later date be compelled to pay in
whole or in part any of the claims set out in Article 1 paragraph (1) the Court or
other competent authority of the country where the fund has been constituted may
order that a sufficient sum shall be provisionally set aside to enable the shipowner
at such later date to enforce his claim against the fund in the manner set out in
the preceding paragraph.
(5) For the purpose of ascertaining the limit of an owner's liability in accordance with
the provisions of this Article the tonnage of a ship of less than 300 tons shall be
deemed to be 300 tons.
(6) The franc mentioned in this article shall be deemed to refer to a unit consisting of
sixty-five and a half milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness nine hundred. The
amounts mentioned in paragraph (1) of this Article shall be converted into the
national currency of the State in which limitation is sought on the basis of the value
of that currency by reference to the unit defined above at the date on which the
shipowner shall have constituted the limitation fund, made the payment or given a
guarantee which under the law of that state is equivalent to such payment.
(7) For the purpose of this Convention tonnage shall be calculated as follows:
- In the case of steamships or other mechanically propelled ships there shall be
taken the net tonnage with the addition of the amount deducted from the gross
tonnage on account of engine room space for the purpose of ascertaining the net
tonnage.




Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 3, paragraph (2) of this Convention,
the rules relating to the constitution and distribution of the limitation fund, if any, and
all rules of procedure shall be governed by the national law of the State in which the
fund is constituted.
Article 5
(1) Whenever a shipowner is entitled to limit his liability under this Convention, and
the ship or another ship or other property in the same ownership has been arrested
within the jurisdiction of a contracting State or bail or other security has been given
to avoid arrest, the Court or other competent authority of such State may order the
release of the ship or other property or of the security given if it is established that
the shipowner has already given satisfactory bail or security in a sum equal to the
full limit of his liability under this Convention and that the bail or other security
so given is actually available for the benefit of the claimant in accordance with his
rights.
(2) Where, in circumstances mentioned in paragraph (1) of this article, bail or other
security has already been given:
(a) at the port where the accident giving rise to the claim occurred;
(b) at the first port of call after the accident if the accident did not occur in a
port;
(c) at the port of disembarkation or discharge if the claim is a personal claim or
relates to damage to cargo;
the Court or other competent authority shall order the release of the ship, bail or
other security given, subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph (1) of this
Article.
(3) The provisions of paragraphs ('1) and (2) of this Article shall apply likewise if the
bail or other security already given is in a sum less than the full limit of liability
under this Convention, provided that satisfactory bail or other security is given for
the balance.
(4) When the shipowner has given bail or other security in a sum equal to the full
limit of his liability under this Convention such bail or other security shall be avail-
able for the payment of all claims arising on a distinct occasion and in respect of
which the shipowner may limit his liability.
(5) Questions of procedure relating to actions brought under the provisions of this Con-
vention and also the time limit within which such actions shall be brought or prose-
cuted shall be decided in accordance with the national law of the Contracting State
in which the action takes place.
Article 6
(1) In this Convention the liability of the shipowner includes the liability of the ship
herself.
(2) Subject to paragraph (3) of this Article, the provisions of this Convention shall
apply to the charterer, manager and operator of the ship, and to the master, mem-
bers of the crew and other servants of the owner, charterer, manager or operator
acting in the course of their employment, in the same way as they apply to an owner
himself: Provided that the total limits of liability of the owner and all such other
persons in respect of personal claims and property claims arising on a distinct oc-
casion shall not exceed the amounts determined in accordance with Article 3 of
this Convention.
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(3) When actions are brought against the master or against members of the crew such
persons may limit their liability even if the occurrence which gives rise to the claims
resulted from the actual fault or privity of one or more of such persons. If, how-
ever, the master or member of the crew is at the same time the owner, coowner,
charterer, manager or operator of the ship, the provisions of this paragraph shall
only apply where the act, neglect or default in question is an act, -neglect or default
committed by the person in question in his capacity as master or as member of the
crew of the ship.
Article 7
This Convention shall apply whenever the owner of a ship, or any other person having
by virtue of the provisions of Article 6 hereof the same rights as an owner of a ship,
limits or seeks to limit his liability before the Court of a Contracting State or seeks to
procure the release of a ship or other property arrested or the bail or other security given
within the jurisdiction of any such State.
Nevertheless, each Contracting State shall have the right to exclude, wholly or par-
tially, from the benefits of this Convention any non-Contracting State, or any person who,
at the time when he seeks to limit his liability or to secure the release of a ship or other
property arrested or the bail or other security in accordance with the provisions of Article
5 hereof, is not ordinarily resident in a Contracting State, or does not have his principal
place of business in a Contracting State, or any ship in respect of which limitation of
liability or release is sought which does not at the time specified above fly the flag of a
Contracting State.
Article 8
Each Contracting State reserves the right to decide what other classes of ship shall
be treated in the same manner as sea-going ships for the purposes of this Convention.
Article 9
This Convention shall be open for signature by the States represented at the tenth
session of the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law.
Article 10
This Convention shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited
with the Belgian Government which shall notify through diplomatic channels all signatory
and acceding States of their deposit.
Article 11
(1) This Convention shall come into force six months after the date of deposit of at
least ten instruments of ratification, of which at least five by States that have each
a tonnage equal or superior to one million gross tons of tonnage.
(2) For each signatory State which ratifies the Convention after the date of deposit of
the instrument of ratification determining the coming into force such as is stipulated
in para. (1) of this article, this Convention shall come into force six months after
the deposit of their instrument of ratification.
Article 12
Any State not represented at the tenth session of the Diplomatic Conference on Mari-
time Law may accede to this Convention.
1718 [Vol. 68:1676
BRUSSELS CONVENTION
The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Belgian Government which
shall inform through diplomatic channels all signatory and acceding States of the deposit
of any such instruments.
The Convention shall come into force in respect of the acceding State six months after
the date of the deposit of the instrument of accession of that State, but not before the
date of entry into force of the Convention as established by Article 11(1).
Article 13
Each High Contracting Party shall have the right to denounce this Convention at any
time after the coming into force thereof in respect of such High Contracting Party.
Nevertheless, this denunciation shall only take effect one year after the date on which
notification thereof has been received by the Belgian Government which shall inform
through diplomatic channels all signatory and acceding States of such notification.
Article 14
(1) Any High Contracting Party may at the time of its ratification of or accession to
this Convention or at any time thereafter declare by written notification to the
Belgian Government that the Convention shall extend to any of the territories for
whose international relations it is responsible. The Convention shall six months after
the date of the receipt of such notification by the Belgian Government extend to
the territories named therein, but not before the date of the coming into force of
the Convention in respect of such High Contracting Party;
(2) A High Contracting Party which has made a declaration under paragraph (1.) of
this article extending the Convention to any territory for whose international rela-
tions it is responsible may at any time thereafter declare by notification given to the
Belgian Government that the Convention shall cease to extend to such territory.
This denunciation shall take effect one year after the date on which notification
thereof has been received by the Belgian government;
(3) The Belgian Government shall inform through diplomatic channels all signatory
and acceding States of any notification received by it under this article.
Article 15
Any High Contracting Party may three years after the coming into force of this Con-
vention in respect of such High Contracting Party or at any time thereafter request that
a conference be convened in order to consider amendments to the Convention.
Any High Contracting Party proposing to avail itself of this right shall notify the
Belgian Government which shall convene the conference within six months thereafter.
Article 16
In respect of the relations between States which ratify this Convention or accede to
it, this Convention shall replace and abrogate the International Convention for the unifi-
cation of certain rules concerning the limitation of the liability of the owners of seagoing
ships, signed at Brussels on the 25th of August 1924.
In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, have signed this Conven-
tion.
Done at Brussels, this tenth day of October 1957, in the French and English lan-
guages, the two texts being equally authentic, in a single copy, which shall remain
deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government, which shall issue certified copies.
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APPENnIX B
STATUS OF CONVENTION IN OTHER NATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE BRUSSELS
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE
Source
(Letter to Yale Law Journal, on
file in Yale Law Library, from:)
No information available at time
of publication.
Study under way on introduction R. C. Maley, Press Attache, Aus-









Dr. Karl Fischer, Second Secre-
tary, Austrian Embassy, May 12,
1959.
Ren6 M6renne, Secretary of Em-
bassy, Belgian Embassy, June 17,
1959.
No information available.
Committee under Ministry of
Commerce considering ratifica-
tion of the Convention as part
of general revision of maritime
law. (See under Norway.)
W. Thune Andersen, Secretary of




Finland Will ratify simultaneously with
other Scandinavian countries.
(See under Norway.)
France Ratification presently before the
President.
Great Britain Convention ratified February 18,
1959.
Greece Under study by Ministry for
Mercantile Marine.
Heinz Capellmann, Consular Secre-
tary, German Embassy, June 22,
1959.
Paavo Laitinen, Attache, Embassy
of Finland, April 17, 1959.
Captain Louis J. Audigou, Ship-
ping Attache, French Embassy,
May 27, 1959.
Merchant Shipping (Liability of
Shipowners and Others) Act, 1958,
6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 62.
Alexis S. Liatis, Ambassador of
Greece, Royal Greek Embassy, May
27, 1959.
Status
No legislation on subject and do
not plan to sign in near future


















Italy No action while awaiting opinion
of shipping interests, but ratifi-
cation unlikely since Convention
is not in line with "Italian tradi-
tional juridical principles."
Japan Convention being studied. No
action expected for a "rather
long time."
Morocco Convention ratified, but will not
(non- take effect until other nations
participant) ratify.
Netherlands In process of amending legisla-
tion for purposes of accepting
Convention.
Norway Legislation being prepared as
part of joint Danish, Finnish,
Norwegian and Swedish revision
of maritime codes. No action
expected before three years, but






S. G. Ramachandran, First Secre-
tary (Commercial), Embassy of
India, May 15, 1959.
Utoyo Sutoto, Commercial Secre-
tary for the Head of the Economic
Division, Embassy of Indonesia,
April 16, 1959.
Dr. Parviz Mahdavi, Counselor,
Iranian Embassy, May 6, 1959.
Gaetano Aulisio, Italian Technical
Delegation, April 13, 1959.
Tomoya Kawamura, Vice Consul,
Assistant Information Officer, In-
formation Office, The Consulate
General of Japan, March 31, 1959.
John W. Mann, Assistant Chief,
Shipping Division, U.S. Depart-
ment of State, March 12, 1959.
Drs. J. J. Schuld, Shipping At-








Currently under study by Span-
ish Parliament.
Santiago de Churruca, Second
Secretary in Charge of Consular
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Status
Questions of Convention referred
to Committee for Maritime
Legislation of 1958. No decision
expected before end of year. (See
also under Norway.)
Source
Stig Ramel, Secretary of Embassy,










Jos6 Gil-Borges, Counselor, Vene-
zuelan Embassy, June 8, 1959.
Dr. Milan Bulajic, Second Secre-
tary, Embassy of the Federal
Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia,
April 14, 1959.
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No information available.
No information available.
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